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STATUTES REPRODUCED 
§ 61-2-11 
Investigations - Subpoena power of division -
Revocation or suspension of license - Grounds 
The division may investigate or cause to 
be investigated the actions of any principal 
broker, associate broker, sales agent, real 
estate school, course provider, or school 
instructor licensed or certified by this 
state, or of any applicant for licensure or 
certification, or of any person who acts in 
any of those capacities within this state. 
The division is empowered to subpoena 
witnesses, take evidence, and require by 
subpoena duces tecum the production of books, 
papers, contracts, records, o^her documentls, 
or information considered relevant to the 
investigation. Each failure to respond to s 
subpoena is considered as a separate 
violation of this chapter. The commission, 
with the concurrence of the director, may 
impose a civil penalty in an amount not td 
exceed $500 per violation or suspend, revdke, 
place on probation, or deny reissuance of any 
license or the certification of a real estate 
school course provider or instructor if at 
any time the licensee or certificate holder, 
whether acting as an agent or on his own 
account, is found guilty of: 
(1) making any substantial misrepresentation; 
(2) making any false promises of a character 
likely to influence, persuade, or induce; 
(3) pursuing a continued and flagrant course 
of misrepresentation, or of making false 
promises through agents, sales agents, 
advertising, or otherwise; 
(4) acting for more than one party in a 
transaction without the informed consent of 
all parties; 
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(5) acting as an associate broker or sales 
agent while not licensed with a licensed 
principal broker, representing or attempting 
to represent a broker other than the 
principal broker with whom he is affiliated, 
or representing as sales agent or having a 
contractual relationship similar to that of 
sales agent with other than a licensed 
principal broker; 
(6) failing, within a reasonable time, to 
account for or to remit any monies coming 
into his possession which belong to others, 
or commingling those funds with his own, or 
diverting those funds from the purpose for 
which they were received; 
(7) paying or offering to pay valuable 
consideration, as defined by the commission, 
to any person not licensed under this 
chapter, except that valuable consideration 
may be shared with a licensed principal 
broker of another jurisdiction or as provided 
under the Professional Corporation Act; 
(8) being unworthy or incompetent to act as a 
principal broker, associate broker, or sales 
agent in such manner as to safeguard the 
inter^ts of the public; 
(9) failing to voluntarily furnish copies of 
all documents to all parties executing the 
documents; 
(10) failing to keep and make available for 
inspection by the division a record of each 
transaction, including the names of buyers 
and sellers, the identification of the 
property, the sale price, any monies received 
in trust, any agreements or instructions from 
buyers or sellers, and any other information 
required by rule; 
(11) failing to disclose, in writing, in the 
purchase or sale of property, whether the 
purchase or sale is made for himself or for 
v 
an undisclosed principal; 
(12) conviction of a criminal offense 
involving moral turpitude; 
(13) advertising the availability of real 
estate or the services of a licensee in a 
false, misleading, or deceptive manner; 
(14) in the case of a principal broker or a 
licensee who is a branch manager, failing to 
exercise reasonable supervision over the 
activities of his licensees and any 
unlicensed staff; 
(15) violating or disregarding this chapter, 
an order of the commission, or the rules 
adopted by the commission and the division; 
(16) breaching a fiduciary duty owed by a 
licensee to his principal in a real estate 
transaction; 
(17) any other conduct which constitutes 
dishonest dealing; or 
(18) unprofessional conduct as defined by 
statute or rule. 
§ 61-2-12 
Disciplinary action - Judicial review 
(1) (a) (i) Before imposing a civil penalty, 
revoking, suspending, placing on probation, 
or reissuance of any license or certificate, 
the division shall give notice to the 
licensee or certificate holder and schedule 
an adjudicative proceeding. 
(ii) If the licensee is an active 
sales agent or active associate 
broker, the division shall inform 
the principal broker with whom the 
licensee is affiliated of the 
charge and of the time and place of 
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the hearing. 
(iii) If after the hearing the 
commission determines that any 
licensee or certificate holder is 
guilty of a violation of this 
chapter, the license or certificate 
may be suspended, revoked, denied 
reissuance, or a civil penalty may 
be imposed by written order of the 
commission in concurrence with the 
director, 
(b) If the hearing is delegated by the 
commission to an administrative law judge, 
and a ruling has been issued by the 
commission and the director, the licensee or 
certificate holder may request 
reconsideration by the commission by filing a 
written request stating specific grounds upon 
which relief is requested. 
(2) (a) Any applicant, certificate holder, 
licensee, or person aggrieved, including the 
complainant, may obtain judicial review or 
agency review by the executive director of 
any adverse ruling, order, or decision of the 
director and the commission. 
(b) If the applicant, certificate holder, or 
licensee prevails in the appeal and the court 
finds that the state action was undertaken 
without substantial justification, the court 
may award reasonable litigation expenses to 
the applicant, certificate holder, or 
licensee as provided under Title 78, Chapter 
27a, Small Business Equal Access to Justice 
Act. 
(c) (i) No order, rule, or decision of the 
director and the commission may take effect 
until 30 days after the time for appeal to 
the court has expired. 
(ii) If an appeal is taken by a 
licensee, the division shall stay 
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enforcement of the commission's 
action in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 63-46b-18. 
(iii) The appeal shall be governed 
by the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
(3) The commission and the director shall 
comply with the procedures and requirementis 
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in their 
adjudicative proceedings. 
§ 61-2-20 
Rights and privileges of sales agent, 
associate brokers, and principal brokers. 
Real estate licensees may fill out those 
forms approved by the Utah Real Estate 
Commission and the attorney general and those 
forms provided by statute, with the following 
exceptions: 
(1) principal brokers and associate brokers 
may fill out any documents associated with 
the closing of a real estate transaction. 
(2) Real estate licensees may fill out r£al 
estate forms prepared by legal counsel of the 
buyer, seller, lessor, or lessee, or any 
legal counsel, provided that the Real Estate 
Commission and attorney general have not 
approved a specific form necessary to that 
transaction. 
§ 63-46b-10-l(e) 
Procedures for formal adjudicative 
proceedings - Orders. 
In formal adjudicative proceedings: 
(1) Within a reasonable time after the 
hearing, or after the filing of any post-* 
hearing papers permitted by the presiding 
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officer, or within the time required by any 
applicable statute or rule of the agency, the 
presiding officer shall sign and issue and 
order that includes: 
(e) a notice of the right to apply 
for reconsideration; 
63-46b-12(6)(c) 
(6)(c) The order on review shall contain: 
(i) a designation of the statute or 
rule permitting or requiring 
review; 
(ii) a statement of the issues 
reviewed; 
(iii) findings of fact as to each 
of the issues reviewed; 
(iv) conclusions of law as to each 
of the issues reviewed; 
(v) the reasons for the 
disposition; 
(vi) whether the decision of the 
presiding officer or agency is to 
be affirmed, reversed, or modified, 
and whether all or any portion of 
the adjudicative proceeding is to 
be remanded; 
(vii) a notice of any right of 
further administrative 
reconsideration or judicial review 
available to aggrieved parties; and 
(viii) the time limits applicable 
to any appeal or review. 
63-46b-13(l)(a) 
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date that 
ix 
an order is issued for which review by the 
agency or by a superior agency under Section 
63-46b-12 is unavailable, and if the order4 
would otherwise constitute final agency 
action, any party may file a written request 
for reconsideration with the agency, stating 
the specific grounds upon which relief is 
requested. 
§ 63-46b-16 
Judicial review - Formal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme 
Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency 
action resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final 
agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner 
shall file a petition for review of agency 
action with the appropriate appellate court 
in the form required by the appellate rules 
of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the 
appropriate appellate court shall 
govern all additional filings and 
proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of 
the agency's record for judicial review of 
formal adjudicative proceedings are governed 
by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
except that: 
(a) all parties to the review 
proceedings may stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the 
record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax 
the cost of preparing transcripts 
x 
and copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who 
unreasonably refuses to 
stipulate to shorten, 
summarize, or organize 
the record; or 
(ii) according to any other 
provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief 
only if, on the basis of the agency's record, 
to determines that a person seeking judicial 
review has been substantially prejudiced by 
any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the 
statute or rule on which the agency 
action is based, is 
unconstitutional on its face or as 
applied; 
(b) the agency had acted beyond 
the jurisdiction conferred by any 
statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all 
of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously 
interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an 
unlawful procedure or decision-
making process, or has failed to 
follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency 
action were illegally constituted 
as a decision-making body or were 
subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based 
upon a determination of fact, made 
xi 
or implied by the agency, that is 
not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of 
the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the 
discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule 
of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the 
agency's prior practice, 
unless the agency 
justifies the 
inconsistency by giving 
facts and reasons that 
demonstrate a fair and 
rational basis for the 
inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary 
or capricious. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(a) 
Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdictionf including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appealsf over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting 
from formal adjudicative proceedings of state 
agencies or appeals from the district couprt 
review of informal adjudicative proceedinigs 
of the agencies, except the Public Serviqe 
Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of 
State Lands, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, 
and the state engineer; 
Rules of Appellate Procedure 
xii 
The record on appeal 
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of 
appellant to order; notice to appellee if 
partial transcript is ordered. 
(2) Transcript required of all 
evidence regarding challenged 
finding or conclusion. I the 
appellant intends to urge on appeal 
that a finding or conclusion is 
unsupported by or is contrary to 
the evidence, the appellant shall 
include in the record a transcript 
of all evidence relevant to such 
finding or conclusion. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal of a final order issued by an 
administrative agency of the State of Utah following a formal 
adjudicative proceeding. This Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §§ 78-2a-3(2)(a) and 63-46b-16. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-l to -22 (1990), applies to this appeal. Because 
of the number of issues raised by Petitioner on this appeal, the 
correct standard of review will be identified with respect to 
each issue. Moreover, the issues will be separated according to 
the fact pattern or case from which they are being raised on 
appeal. 
FACT PATTERN I (THE STONES TRANSACTION) 
1. Was the ALJ correct in holding that Krantz violated the 
provisions of 61-2-11 by making "any false promises of a 
character likely to influence, persuade or induce" in the "Stone" 
matter. 
Standard of Review; This issue calls for the Division's 
application of facts to its own regulations and therefore falls 
under an intermediate standard of review. Under this standard, 
the courts will accord the agency decision with deference if it 
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is reasonable and rational. Vali Convalescent & Care Inst, v. 
DOH, 797 P.2d 438, 443 (Utah App. 1990). 
2. Was Krantz required to investigate whether or not CSC could 
assume the Stone's mortgage before making a promise to assume the 
mortgage in exchange for the Stone's promise to purchase a home 
from CSC? 
Standard of Review; This issue presents a question of fact 
which the court will sustain "only if' they are supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court." Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 
63, 67 (Utah App. 1989) . 
3. Was the A.L.J.'s erroneous in finding that Krantz's conduct 
was reckless in light of the fact that the agreement between the 
Stones and CSC contained a condition contingent upon third party 
approval and which gave the Stones the option to void the 
agreement upon failure of the condition? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of fact 
which the court will sustain "only if they are supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court." Grace, at 67. 
4. Does the fact that CSC's obligation to purchase the Stone's 
condominium was conditioned upon the approval of a lending 
institution to allow CSC to assume the mortgage or obtain 
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alternative financing excuse Krantz from determining first 
whether CSC could assume the mortgage before making the promise? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a mixed question of 
fact and law and should be reviewed under an intermediate 
standard of review. Under that standard, the courts will accord 
the agency decision with deference if it is reasonable and 
rational. Vali at 443. 
5. Did the Stones rely on Krantz's promise to their detriment? 
Standard of Review; This issue presents a question of fact 
which the court will sustain "only if they are supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court." Grace at 67. 
GASTER TRANSACTION 
6. Did the Administrative Law Judge correctly rule that Krantz 
committed a misrepresentation by omission by failing to disclose 
to the Gaster's at the time of closing that CSC was delinquent in 
paying for labor and materials? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a mixed question of 
fact and law and should be reviewed under an intermediate 
standard of review. Under that standard, the courts will accord 
the agency decision with deference if it is reasonable and 
rational. Vali at 443. 
7. Did the fact that the Gasters were represented by another 
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licensed real estate agent excuse Krantz for his failure to 
disclose unpaid bills that could subject the property to 
mechanics liens? 
Standard of Review; This issue presents a question of fact 
which the court will sustain "only if they are supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court." Grace at 67. 
8. Did the administrative law judge incorrectly conclude that 
Krantz's failure to disclose the unpaid bills was intentional 
despite his also finding that Krantz was not aware of CSC's weak 
financial condition until after closing. 
Standard of Review; This issue presents a question of fact 
which the court will sustain "only if they are supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court." Grace at 67. 
9. Did CSC's payment and discharge of the mechanics liens 
preclude the administrative law judge from concluding that Krantz 
committed a material and substantial misrepresentation? 
Standard of Review; This issue presents a question of fact 
which the court will sustain "only if they are supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court." Grace at 67. 
10. Did Krantz owe the Gaster's any duty beyond closing? 
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Standard of Review; This issue presents a question of fact 
which the court will sustain "only if they are supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court." Grace at 67. 
11. Was Krantz's failure to use an earnest money sales agreement 
approved by the Utah Real Estate Commission and the Utah Attorney 
General's Office constitute unprofessional conduct? 
Standard of Review: This issue calls for the Division's 
application of facts to its own regulations and therefore falls 
under an intermediate standard of review. Under the intermediate 
standard of review, the courts will accord the agency decision 
with deference if it is reasonable and rational. Vali at 443. 
ALLEGED DUE PROCESS ALLEGATIONS 
12. Was Krantz substantially prejudiced by the fact nine months 
expired between the date of the hearing the issuance of the order 
revoking Krantz's license? 
13. Did the Division's failure to provide Krantz with notice of 
a right to request reconsideration violative of Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-10-l(e)? 
14. Is the decision of the Division Director and the Real Estate 
Commission so vague as to render it unenforceable? 
15. Was Krantz deprived of State and Federal Due process by the 
Division's failure to provide interpretive rules that put him on 
5 
notice of prohibited conduct? 
16. Was Krantz deprived of State and Federal Due process by the 
Division's failure to publish summaries of complaint resolutions 
so as to allow Krantz to argue that the Division's actions are 
contrary to the agency's prior practice? 
Standard of Review: This issuers above all present questions 
of law which is reviewed for correctness. Grace at 67. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal j-solves two cases arising from separate 
petitions that were filed by the Division of Real Estate against 
the Petitioner. The petitions were consolidated and heard 
simultaneously on May 29-30, 1991. For the sake of organization, 
the following statement of facts, which have been taken almost 
verbatim from the written findings of fact issued by the 
administrative law judge ("ALJ"), will be treated separately. 
Case No. RE87-11-19 (Fact Situation II) 
THE STONES TRANSACTION 
1. Krantz at all times relevant to this proceedings has 
been, the principal broker for Copper State Realty (Referred to 
hereafter as "CSR") and president of Copper State Construction ( 
Referred to hereafter as "CSC"). (R./263) 
2. In late 1987, Robert and Peggy Stone owned a 
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condominium located in Taylorsville, Utah. Based on a referral 
from a co-worker for whom CSC had built a home, the Stones 
contacted Max Lloyd, a sales agent affiliated with CSR. The 
Stones and Mr. Lloyd discussed the possible sale of the Stone's 
condominium to CSC, coupled with the Stone's purchase of a home 
to be constructed by CSC. Mr. Lloyd introduced the Stones to 
Krantz at the CSR office. (R./263) 
3. Pursuant to December 2, 1987, earnest money sales 
agreement, CSC offered to purchase the Stone's condominium for 
$88,000. The offer provided for a $100 earnest money deposit, 
which had been received by Mr. Lloyd, a $14,400 cash down payment 
and the possible assumption by CSC of the Stone's existing 
$73,500 mortgage. The offer was made subject to the following 
conditions: 
Seller to have the right to market and sell this 
property any time prior to completion of their new home 
located at (Murray, Utah. Lot #5 Ridge Creek. This 
offer is null and void if property is sold to a third 
party prior to completion of seller's new home. 
The offer further provided that if CSC was required to 
assume the Stone's existing mortgage "and/or obtain outside 
financing", CSC agreed to use best efforts to do so and the offer 
was made subject to CSC's "qualifying for and lending institution 
granting said assumption and/or financing". The offer further 
recited that the Vendors, the Stones, could void the agreement 
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upon written notice if CSC failed to qualify or financing or 
assumption of the loan. CSC agreed to apply to assume the 
underlying obligation and/or obtain new financing within ten (10) 
days after the Stone's acceptance of the offer. The offer also 
recites the transaction would close on or before May 15, 19 87. 
Given the date of the earnest money sales agreement, the just-
stated date is obviously in error, the parties intending the 
closing to occur on or before May 15, 1988. (R./263-264) 
4. On December 28, 1987, the Stones made a counter offer, 
which provided they would not be liable for any real estate 
commissions. On the just-stated date, the Stones and Krantz—as 
president of CSC—executed a December 10, 11987 contract, whereby 
the Stones agreed to purchase property located on Lot #5, Ridge 
Creek Subdivision in Murray, Utah and further agreed to purchase 
a home to be constructed on that property by CSC. The contract 
price was $170,000 and the Stones made a $1,500 deposit toward 
payment on the contract. The just-stated contract was also 
subject to the Stones qualifying for financing on the new home. 
CSC agreed to start construction on or before December 30, 1987 
and complete construction within 145 days from that date. 
(R./264) 
5. The document used by the Stones and CSC was not the 
standard earnest money sales agreement form for residential 
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construction. Rather, Krantz had obtained the form contract 
which he used from a friend who had-in-turn—obtained it from an 
attorney. (R./264) 
6. On December 6,1987, Krantz—on behalf of CSC— accepted 
the Stone's counter offer. The $100 earnest money had been 
deposited to the CSR trust account on December 21, 1987. The 
Stones relied on CSC's agreement to purchase their condominium 
and assume the existing mortgage when they agreed to purchase the 
new home. The Stones believed if their condominium was not sold 
prior to completion of the construction on the new home, CSC 
would either assume the existing mortgage on the condominium or 
obtain the financing and—in either case—the Stones would no 
longer be obligated on the existing mortgage. However, Krantz 
only intended to purchase the home on a simple assumption of the 
existing loan, which would have been consistent with CSC's common 
and preferred practice when it agreed to build a new home in 
trade for an existing residence.(R./264-265) 
7. As of December 29, 1987, the Stones did not know under 
what circumstances the existing mortgage on the condominium could 
be assumed. Mr. Lloyd or Krantz neither discussed that matter 
with the Stones at that time nor did they ever make any inquiry 
of the lender at that time whether the loan could be assumed. or 
that Mr. Lloyd and Krantz discussed any possible assumption of 
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the loan by CSC. (R./265) 
8. In mid-May 1988, the Stones contacted Krantz as their 
new home was nearing completion. The Stone's condominium had not 
been sold by that time. The Stones requested Krantz to undertake 
efforts to assume the existing loan on their condominium. Krantz 
informed the Stones that he had only intended to market their 
condominium for resale and had only promised to make payments on 
the existing mortgage until the condominium was sold and he never 
intended to formally assume the existing loan to thus relieve the 
Stones from future li^Lility for any pr^ arents on that loan. 
Thereafter, Krantz—on behalf of CSC—contacted the lender on the 
mortgage for the Stone's condominium and was informed CSC could 
not purchase the condominium on a simple assumption, due to an 
owner occupancy requirement. When Krantz subsequently offered to 
purchase the Stone's condominium on contract, the Stones declined 
that offer. (R./265) 
9, The Stones had sought financing from Crossland Mortgage 
Company to purchase the new home. Approval of any such financing 
was contingent on the sale of the Stone's condominium. On July 
26, 1988, the Stones notified CSC they were terminating the 
contract to purchase the new home due to their inability to 
obtain financing. CSC could not formally assume the loan on the 
Stone's existing condominium nor was it ever Krantz's intent that 
10 
CSC would do so. The Stones refused to sell their condominium to 
CSC on a simple assumption because it was never their intent to 
do so and they had initially agreed to sell the condominium with 
the understanding that only CSC would be thereafter obligated to 
make payment in satisfaction of the outstanding indebtedness on 
the condominium. (R./265-266). 
10. On July 26, 1988, the Stones demanded return of both 
the $1,500 deposit regarding the new home and the $100 earnest 
money deposit CSC had made respecting its' offer to purchase 
their condominium. ^he Stones also filed a complaint with the 
Salt Lake Board of Realtors. On August 1, 1988, Krantz received 
a notice from the Salt Lake Board of Realtors concerning that 
complaint. In late August or early September 1988, proceedings 
wee conducted before a Board arbitration committee. On October 
10, 1988, the Stones and CSC reached an agreement, whereby the 
latter would return the $1,500 deposit paid by the Stones and the 
Stones executed a release of the $100 earnest money. (R./266) 
Case No. RE89-03-12 
THE GASTER TRANSACTION 
1. The findings of fact previously set forth in Paragraph 
1 of Case No. RE87-11-19 (Factual Statement II) are incorporated 
herein by reference.(R./272) 
2. As of January 1988, James and Valerie Gaster owned a 
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house located at 7588 Dover Hill Drive in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Approximately two (2) years earlier, the Gasters had listed that 
property for sale through Terry Hill-Black, a real estate sales 
agent. Mrs. Gaster initially contacted Krantz in late 1987 and 
she generally inquired about a possible trade of the Gaster home 
for another residence. Mrs. Gaster also contacted Mq. Hill-Black 
about a possible trade of properties in that regard.(R./272) 
3. Mr. Gaster saw an advertisement by CSR and he 
specifically contacted Krantz to inquire about a traqe of the 
Gaster residence for a new home. Mr. Gaster met with Krantz in 
late January or early February 1988 and Krantz saw the Gaster 
home, which was available for sale by owner at that time. Ms. 
Hill-Black accompanied the Gasters when they saw a new homef 
located at 358 E. Bridlewalk Lane in Murray, Utah, built by CSC. 
(R./272) 
4. On February 9, 1988, the Gasters offered to' purchase 
the Bridlewalk Lane property from CSC for $189,000. Ms. Hill-
Black, who was affiliated with Gump & Ayers Real Estate, Inc., 
represented the Gasters and she prepared that earnest money sales 
agreement, which provided the Gasters would apply for financing 
through Crossland Mortgage Corporation.(R./272) 
5. On February 9, 1988, CSC offered to purchase the 
Gaster's home for $102,000. Ms. Hill-Black prepared that earnest 
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money sales agreement at Krantz's direction, but it was Krantz 
who represented the Gasters as their agent in that transaction. 
Krantz, acting as principal broker for CSR, receipted the earnest 
money deposit on that offer and he signed the offer in his 
capacity as president of CSC.(R./272) 
6. The just-described offer, which provided CSC would 
assume the $83,000 existing mortgage on the Gaster's home, was 
also made subject to the following conditions: 
Seller to have the right to market or sell property any 
time prior to completion of home located at 358 E. 
Bridlewalk Lane, if home is sold prior to completion of 
buyer's new home, this offer is null & void. 
On February 10, 1988, the Gasters accepted the offer. Five 
days later, the Gasters entered into a listing agreement with 
CSR, whereby the Dover Hill Drive property was listed for sale at 
$94,000.(R./272-273) 
7. Sparing detail, addendums to both offers were executed 
on March 15, 1988, whereby the sale price on the Dover Hill Drive 
and Bridlewalk Lane properties were reduced to $94,000 and 
$181,000, respectively. The sale of each property was scheduled 
to close on April 1, 1988. The Gasters applied for a 
conventional mortgage through Crossland Mortgage Corporation to 
purchase the Bridlewalk Lane property. Proof of the Gaster's 
sale of their home was a necessary condition to the financing on 
their purchase of the Bridlewalk Lane property. (R./273) 
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8. The closing on each transaction was conducted on April 
21, 1988. Krantz, Ms. Hill-Black and the Gasters were among 
those present at that time. Krantz signed the closing statements 
as president of CSC. Both Gump & Ayers Real Estate, Inc. and CSR 
shared the commission on the sale of the Bridlewalk Lane 
property. Mr. Gaster executed a warranty deed to CSC, whereby 
the latter assumed and agreed to pay an all-inclusive trust deed 
with a current principle balance of $82,988.24 in favor of a Dean 
C. Burnham and Charlotte L. Beeson. Copies of the settlement 
statement and the warranty deed on the sale of the Dover Hill 
Drive property were submitted to Crossland Mortgage Corporation 
as proof of the sale of that property. Crossland Mortgages 
Corporation closed the loan on the Gaster's purchase of the 
Bridlewalk Lane property in reliance on those documents. (R./27 3) 
9. Krantz reasonably believed CSC would be able to make 
the necessary payments when CSC purchased the Dover Hill Drive 
property. However, several homes which CSC had contracted to 
build were not timely completed between sometime in April 1988 
through June 1988 and various closings on newly constructed homes 
were delayed or did not occur during that time. Consequently, 
CSC lacked the funds necessary to satisfy payments due on the 
Dover Hill Drive property.(R./273-274) 
10. Sometime between April 1988 and June 14, 1988, three 
14 
liens were filed on the Bridlewalk Lane property by 
subcontractors and suppliers for non-payment of services and 
materials provided during the construction of that house. 
Specifically, a $244 lien was filed sometime in April 1988 for 
garage doors which had been installed. This record does not 
reflect exactly when that lien was filed. A $4,133 lien was 
filed on April 22, 1988 for materials provided by Jordan Home 
Builders and a $2,980 lien was filed on June 14, 1988 for labor 
and materials provided by Prows Plastering. Krantz did not 
inform the Gasters at closing that ar * subc tractors or 
materialmen had not been paid. CSC subsequently made payments to 
satisfy the just-described liens, although this record does not 
reflect when those payments were made. (R./274) 
11. CSC's first payment on the trust deed note was June 1, 
1988. Ms. Beeson contacted Mr. Gaster and informed him no 
payment had been made. The latter then required on Krantz, who 
indicated the payment had been made, but not properly credited. 
There is no substantial evidence any such payment was made. 
Approximately one month later, Mr. Gaster became aware still no 
payments had been made. Mr. Gaster then contacted Krantz, who 
indicated he would attempt to make the necessary payments. 
(R./274) 
12. On September 4, 1988, a notice of default was recorded 
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which reflected a $4,705 delinquency for non-payment from June 
through September 1988- On February 7, 1989, notice was issued 
of a trustee sale to be conducted with respect to the Dover Hill 
Drive property. The Gasters subsequently paid $8,750 to 
relinquish all claims and avoid foreclosure on that property. 
(R./274) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. KRANTZ'S FAILURE TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE PRECLUDES 
HIM FROM CONTESTING FACTUAL FINDINGS BY THE ALJ. 
Krantz contests numerous factual findings in his brief but 
has failed to provide a transcript or marshall the evidence 
sufficient to sustain his arguments on this appeal. Krantz 
contests the factual findings of the ALJ with respect to numerous 
issues that are factual and not legal in nature. 
For example, Krantz contests the ALJ's findings in the 
Stone's transactions that he acted recklessly (Brief at 24); or 
that the Stones could reasonably rely on his promise (Brief at 
25); and finally that the Stones could not have suffered any 
detriment by his representations (Brief at 26). 
Krantz also challenges the factual findings of the ALJ with 
regards to the Gaster transaction. He specifically challenges 
the ALJ's findings that the Gaster's reasonably relied on him as 
their agent (Brief at 28) and that he owed them a duty. 
By his failure to provide a complete record and marshall all 
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of the evidence Krantz is precluded from contesting the ALJ's 
factual findings and the court should presume that the ALJ's 
findings are supported by substantial evidence. State v. 
Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 946, 947 (Utah App. 1990). 
2. KRANTZ OWED MORE THE STONES MORE THAN A DUTY TO ACT IN 
GOOD FAITH, 
Krantz contends that his sole duty to the Stone was to act 
in good faith (Brief at p.20). Given the court's pronouncements 
on the subject, the Division maintains that as a licensed real 
estate broker, Krantz owe both the Stones and the Gasters a duty 
of honesty, integrity, truthfulness and competency. Dugan v. 
Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980). Krantz had a duty to 
investigate to determine first under what, if any circumstances, 
CSC could assume the Stones mortgage before promising to assume 
it if the Stones could not find another buyer within a stated 
period. Krantz failure to do so constitutes violation of section 
61-2-11(2)(making a false promise). Utah Code Ann.§ (1988). 
3. KRANTZ'S MISREPRESENTATIONS TO THE GASTERS ARE NO 
EXCUSED BY THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE ANOTHER AGENT. 
Krantz owed a duty as a licensed real estate broker 
regardless of the involvement of the other agent in the 
transaction. His failure to disclose the existence of 
outstanding debts for labor and material on the home purchased by 
the Gasters constituted a serious breach of his duty as a 
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licensee- Dugan at 1246. This applies with equal weight to 
Krantz misrepresentation after the date of closing. 
Krantz cannot excuse his own conduct because another agent 
failed to find out about and protect the Gaster's interest 
against Krantz's misrepresentation. Moreover, the language of 
61-2-11 applies to Krantz whether he is acting as agent "or on 
his own account." Utah Code Ann. § (1988). 
4. KRANTZ USED AN UNAUTHORIZED FORM IN STONES TRANSACTION 
It is uncontroverted that the form used by Krantz in the 
Stones transaction was not oproved by the Commission or by the 
Attorney General's Office. The Division interpretation of the 
section 61-2-20 is that it allows licensees to conduct 
transactions which do not constitute the unauthorized practice of 
law. Krantz's interpretation that it is merely a permissive 
provision runs contrary to that intcmt. 
5. THE NINE MONTH DELAY IN ISSUING ORDER DID NOT 
PREJUDICE KRANTZ 
Krantz was not harmed by the nine month delay in the 
issuance of the order in this matter. His license was not 
restricted during pendency of order and as it has is not 
restricted during this appeal. 
6. KRANTZ ONLY HAS ONE LICENSE. 
The order of the Division revoking Krantz's license has 
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taken the only license Krantz has. The revocation does not 
demote Krantz from broker to sales agent. Consequently, the final 
order of the Commission and the Division does not expand the 
scope of the recommended order issued by the ALJ. 
7. KRANTZ DOES NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO RECONSIDERATION 
Section 63-46b-13 provides that the right of agency 
reconsideration is available only when a right of review by the 
agency or by a superior agency is not. Utah Code Ann. § (1989). 
Krantz misconstrued section 63-46b-10(l)(e) and 12(6)(c) by 
failing to read it in conjunction with section 63-46b-13. 
8. THE DIVISION PUBLISHES DISCIPLINARY ACTION 
The division has published newsletters reviewing 
disciplinary action taken against licensees for the past ten 
years. Krantz's argument that the Division failed to give him 
the opportunity to determine whether the agency was being 
consistent is without merit. 
9. THE DIVISION DOES NOT HAVE A DUTY TO PROVIDE 
COMPREHENSIVE REGULATION. 
Krantz's argument that the Division's rules do not provide 
adequate notice is without merit. Krantz as well as other 
licensees are capable of understanding the standards which govern 
their profession. The Division cannot possibly promulgate rules 
which cover every conceivable ethical or professional dilemma. In 
Re Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah App. 1988). 
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ARGUMENT 
I. KRANTZ IS PRECLUDED FROM CONTESTING THE FACTUAL 
FINDINGS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 
On August 21, 1992, Krantz certified with this Court, that 
no transcript would be requested in this case. (Exhibit "A"). 
Moreover, although the Division filed a certified record of all 
exhibits, pleadings and orders for purposes of this review, 
Krantz has determined that only a handful of exhibits are 
necessary to support his contentions (which are abundant) on this 
appeal. (Brief at addendum A-G). Because of Krantz's failure to 
provide, this court with a complete record and to marshall all of 
the evidence both supportive and contrary to Krantz's position, 
Krantz should be precluded from contesting the factual findings 
of the administrative law judge. 
Upon reviewing Krantz's brief, it is clear that Krantz 
repeatedly disputes and in a few instances mischaracterizes 
several of the factual findings issued by the Division. Krantz 
also makes several findings of his own that are neither cited to 
nor based upon the record. A few of Krantz's statements are 
entirely inaccurate and contradictory to the findings issued by 
the administrative law judge. 
The instances in which Krantz has either contested the ALJ's 
factual findings without marshalling the evidence, or has 
mischaracterized or added findings that are not found in the 
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record are scattered throughout his brief. What follows are 
those instances in which the Division claims that Krantz has 
challenged a factual finding of the ALJ without adequate support 
in the record or without marshalling all of evidence. 
1. KRANTZ CANNOT THE ALJ'S FINDING THAT KRANTZ ACTED 
RECKLESSLY IN THE STONES TRANSACTION. 
Krantz contests the ALJ's findings that he acted recklessly 
by failing to determine whether CSC could assume the Stone's 
mortgage. Krantz's only basis for challenging the ALJ's finding 
is that the earnest money agreement between CSC and the Stones 
was contingent upon third party approval. (Brief at 24) Krantz's 
failure to marshall all of the evidence both in support of, and 
contrary to his position deprives the court of the ability to 
review this finding under the substantial evidence standard of 
review. 
Krantz cites a Utah Court of Appeals decision in First 
National Bank of Boston v. County Board of Equalization of Salt 
Lake County, for the proposition that an "agency's decision must 
not be 'a creation of fiat."' 799 P.2d 1163f 1166 (Utah App. 
1990)(Brief at 24). In Boston, the Utah Tax Commission conducted 
proceedings to determine the proper tax assessment on property 
owned by Boston First National. IdL at 1164. On appeal, the 
amount of the assessment was the only matter challenged by Boston 
First National. Because the assessment involved a question of 
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fact, the court reviewed the Commission's finding under the 
substantial evidence test. JEd.. at 1165. 
In applying the substantial evidence test, the court 
explained that it was required to "consider both the evidence 
that supports the Tax Commission's factual findings and the 
evidence that detracts from its findings." Jld. Moreover the 
court observed, "Nevertheless the party challenging the 
findings -in this case the taxpayer-must marshall all of the 
evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the 
supporting facts, the Tr>x Commission's findir^j are not supported 
by substantial evidence." Id. 
The court overturned the Tax Commission's decision because 
"nothing in the record indicates how the Tax Commission arrived 
at the figures for expenses." JTci. Boston First National met that 
burden. J[ci. It was the Commission's failure to provide support 
its conclusion with "some sound evidentiary basis" that led the 
court to characterize the Commission's finding as a "creation of 
fiat." Id. at 1166. 
Krantz, has not marshalled the evidence, which primarily 
involved two days of oral testimony and numerous exhibits. 
(R./257). He therefore is in a poor position to characterize the 
ALJ's decision as 'a creation of fiat.' 
2. KRANTZ CANNOT CONTEST THE ALJ'S FINDING THAT THE 
STONE'S RELIANCE ON KRANTZ WAS REASONABLE. 
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Second, Krantz asserts that the Stone's reliance on 
Krantz's promise was unreasonable. (Brief at 25) This assertion 
is contrary to the finding of the ALJ "that the Stones acted 
reasonably and in ignorance of whether their loan on the 
condominium could be assumed by CSC." (R./269). Krantz claims 
that because the mortgage was on the Stone's condominium that 
they were in a better position than Krantz to know the terms 
under which it could be assumed by CSC (Brief at 25) Krantz 
further argues that the Stones knew their loan was assumable 
because hey held it out as being assumable with another agent. 
Ld. 
Krantz's contentions are without merit. First, Krantz fails 
to recognize that the ALJ's conclusion was not simply based on 
the failure of CSC qualify for a simple assumption of the Stone's 
mortgage. The ALJ found that the Stone's mortgage could not be 
assumed by CSC under any circumstances because of an 
owner/occupant requirement. (R./265). Second, there are no facts 
in the record, or any cited by Krantz, that would demonstrate 
contrary to the ALJ's finding that the Stones acted reasonably 
and in ignorance of whether CSC could assume their mortgage. The 
fact that the Stones held out through another listing that their 
loan was assumable is irrelevant and does not support Krantz's 
assertion. The loan was assumable, but not by CSC because of an 
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owner/occupant requirement. The point is that Krantz's failure 
to marshall all of the evidence deprives the Court of the ability 
to determine what the whole record would reveal on this issue. 
3. KRANTZ CANNOT CHALLENGE THE ALJ'S FINDING THAT THE 
STONE'S SUFFERED HARM. 
The last factual issue contested by Krantz in the Stones 
transaction is the ALJ's finding that the Stones suffered harm as 
a result of his actions. (Brief at 26) Most disturbing is the 
fact that Krantz offers his own version of the facts without so 
much as a citation to the record or an exhibit, or any 
explanation why his findings are inverse to the findings made by 
the ALJ. 
Krantz represents to this court, "that the Stones and Krantz 
submitted their claims regarding the* $100 earnest money deposit 
to arbitration, and the award was to Krantz." (Brief at 26). 
Krantz then concludes, "The conclusion of the arbitration panel 
that the deposit should be awarded to Krantz and the release of 
Krantz from further liability should be determinative that the 
Stones were not damaged in the transactions, and the Judge erred 
to Krantz's substantial prejudice in concluding otherwise." 
(Brief at 26-27) 
There is not a single citation to the record nor support in 
the record for Krantz's bald assertions. The findings of the 
ALJ, who received two days of testimony and viewed the exhibits, 
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is that the Stones demanded return of their $1,500 deposit and 
$100 earnest money deposit CSC had made respecting their offer to 
purchase the Stone's condominium. (R./266) The Stones also filed 
a complaint with the Salt Lake Board of Realtors in August or 
September of 1988. Id. On October 10, 1988, the Stones and CSC 
reached an agreement, where CSC agreed to return the $1,500 
deposit to the Stones and the Stones executed a release of the 
$100 earnest money.(emphasis added) Id. 
The ALJ's findings of fact with respect to the harm suffered 
by cli^  Stones conflicts with Krantz's version of events. 
Krantz's rendition of the facts is entirely lacking in support in 
the record. Moreover, Krantz's failure to provide a transcript 
and otherwise marshall the evidence surrounding this issue and 
the other factual issues discussed above, preclude him from 
contesting the ALJ's factual findings. The ALJ's findings of 
fact are entitled to a presumption that they are adequately 
supported by substantial evidence. 
4. KRANTZ IS PRECLUDED FROM CONTESTING THE FACTUAL 
FINDINGS OF THE ALJ IN THE GASTERS TRANSACTION. 
Krantz contests two factual findings involving the Gaster 
transaction. First, Krantz argues that he did not owe a duty to 
the Gasters because they were represented by the their own agent. 
(Brief at 28). The Gaster's agent, according to Krantz, bore the 
sole responsibility for his failure to disclose to the Gasters 
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that there were outstanding debts owing for materials and labor 
on the home constructed by CSC and sold to the Gasters. (R./275) 
Krantz argues that the Gaster's agent had the duty to inquire of 
Krantz at the time of closing whether there were any outstanding 
debts for labor or materials. (Brief at 28) 
Krantz also asserts that the other agent had a duty to 
assure that the agreement between CSC and the Gasters contained 
an "extended title insurance protecting against mechanics liens." 
(Brief at 28). In essence, Krantz asserts that Gaster's agent 
had a duty to protect them from Krantz's misrepresentations. 
What Krantz fails to mention is that ALJ specifically found 
that Krantz was acting all times relative to this transaction as 
an agent to the Gasters. (R./272) Krantz, acting as the 
principal broker of CSR, represented the Gasters in the sale of 
the Gaster's home to CSC (R./272). Krantz also received the 
earnest money deposit on CSC's offer and signed on CSC's 
behalf.(R./272) Krantz was acting as an agent to the Gasters on 
the date he failed to disclose to them that there were 
outstanding debts for labors and materials on the home the 
Gaster's were purchasing. (R./273-274). 
Krantz's blatant disregard for the record prevents the court 
from conducting an appropriate review. Krantz has not met his 
burden due to his failure to marshall the evidence. 
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5. KRANTZ CANNOT CHALLENGE THE ALJ'S FINDING THAT HIS 
MISREPRESENTATION TO THE GASTERS WAS INTENTIONAL. 
Krantz asserts that the ALJ's finding, that he intentionally 
failed to disclose the existence of unpaid bills at closing on 
sale of the new home to the Gasters (R./275-276) was inconsistent 
with the ALJ's finding that Krantz was not aware of CSC's 
"perilous financial condition" until after the closing. (Brief at 
29)(R./275) 
The ALJ's finding, that Krantz was aware of unpaid bills at 
the time of closing, is entirely different from the conclusion 
that Krantz was unaware of the financial condition of CSC. 
Perhaps a transcript of the testimony would have shed more light 
on this issue. Absent a transcript or complete record, the court 
is left to speculate on the issue of intent. An exercise, as I 
will argue below, the court should decline to become involved 
with. 
II. THE COURT SHOULD PRESUME THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF 
THE ALJ ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
As the appellant, Krantz carries the burden of marshalling 
the evidence that demonstrates the Division's findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and order are clearly erroneous. A petitioner 
challenging an agency's factual findings must separately marshall 
the evidence that supports and contradicts the findings of the 
agency in order to obtain appellate review under the Utah 
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Administrative Procedure Act's "substantial evidence in light of 
the whole record" standard of review. Johnson-Bowles v. Division 
of Securities, 829 P.2d 101, 107 (Utah App. 1992), Heinecke v. 
Dep't of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah App. 1991). 
Simply put, Krantz has a duty to "see that the record 
contains the materials necessary to support his appeal State v. 
Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 946, 947 (Utah App. 1990)(Absent 
record or transcript supporting defendant's factual contentions 
on appeal, court presumes that the ruling is adequately 
supported), and see, Sawyers v. Sawyers, 558 P.2d 607, 608 (Utah 
197 6)(Supreme Court can not resolve or undertake to determine 
appeals involving factual matters without a transcript of the 
testimony.) 
Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate procedure 
provides, "If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a 
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the 
evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a transcript 
of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion." (1992). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has explained that it can only presume 
that a judgment was supported by sufficient evidence where the 
appellant failed to provide all relevant evidence on appeal. 
State v. Nine Thousand One Hundred Ninety Nine Dollars, 791 P.2d 
213 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
28 
Krantz does not have the luxury of raising numerous factual 
issues before the court and then providing his own rendition of 
the facts. It is inappropriate to place so many factual issues 
in dispute without making the appropriate citations to the record 
or without marshalling all of the evidence that both supports and 
contradicts the appellant's position. Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l 
Life Ins Co., 588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978)(Court need not, and will 
not consider any facts not properly cited to, or supported by the » 
record). 
Consequently, the Division requests rhat the court presume 
for the sake of this appeal that all of the findings of fact 
issued by the ALJ and confirmed and adopted by the Utah Real 
Estate Commission and the Division Director, are supported by 
substantial evidence. 
III. KRANTZ IS GUILTY OF MAKING A FALSE PROMISE TO THE 
STONES. 
1. Standard of Review 
Before arguing on this issue on the merits, it is necessary 
for this court to first determine which standard of review to 
apply in reviewing the Division's rulings on this issue. 
"Different standards apply to different aspects of administrative 
adjudications." Vali, 797 P.2d 438, 443 (Utah App.1990). When 
reviewing the factual findings of an agency, the court will not 
upset the agency's findings so long as they are "based upon any 
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evidence of substance." Savage Industries v. State Tax Comm'n, 
811 P.2d 664, SSI (Utah 1991), When reviewing an agency's 
application of its statutory standards or regulations to the 
facts or when an agency construes a statutory terms, it becomes a 
somewhat difficult exercise to determine the appropriate standard 
to follow. 
Issues not involving solely questions of fact are 
characterized routinely as either being "questions of law" and 
"mixed questions of law and fact". Sparing a in depth analysis 
on the subject, the TJr*h Supreme Court recently announced that 
which standard of review to apply to an agency's interpretation 
or application of statutory provisions, turns less on the 
characterization of the issue as being either a question of law 
or mixed question of fact and law and more on the question of how 
much deference should be accorded the agency's decision. Morton 
Intern.,Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 586-87 (Utah 1991). 
In Morton the Utah Supreme Court reviewing the decision of the 
Utah Tax Commission observed, 
We do not defer to the commission when construing 
statutory terms or when applying statutory terms to the 
facts unless the construction of the statutory language 
or the application of the law to the facts should be 
subject to the Commission's expertise gleaned from its 
accumulated practical, first-hand experience with the 
subject matter. 
Id. at 587. 
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Based on the foregoing, the ALJ's ruling with respect to 
Krantz's violation of section 61-2-11, and other statutory-
violations, would be reviewed by this court as either a question 
of law or a mixed question of law fact depending on the court's 
application of the criteria established under Morton. 
The Division's interpretation of the language found in 61-2-
11 should be accorded deference by this court. In Rogers v. 
Division of Real Estate, 790 P.2d 102 (Utah App. 1990), this 
court reviewed under the intermediate standard of review, the 
o;"ier of the Division of Real Estate revoking the license of the 
appellant based upon their finding that Rogers was guilty of 
section 61-2-11(8) (being "worthy and incompetent"). 
By virtue of the experience and expertise of the Commission 
and the broad grant of authority delegated to the Division and 
Commission, the Division's and Commission's interpretation 
section 61-2-11, and other statutory provisions, should be 
accorded substantial deference and should be reviewed under the 
intermediate standard of review for reasonableness and 
rationality. 
1. KRANTZ'S CHALLENGE TO THE ALJ'S FACTUAL FINDINGS 
REQUIRES THE COURT TO APPLY THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
TEST TO THE DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 
Contrary to Krantz's characterization of issues in the 
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Standard of Review section in his brief (Brief at 4-6), it is 
evident from Krantz's arguments that he disputes the ALJ's and 
the Division's findings of fact and not the ALJ's application of 
the statute, section 61-2-11, to those facts. (Brief at 23 - 27). 
Although the Division's interpretation of 61-2-11 should be 
reviewed under the intermediate standard of review, the court 
should presume, based on the Division's arguments raised above, 
that the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial 
evidence. Krantz's characterization of an issue as being either 
a question of law or mixed question of fact and law should be 
accorded no deference. Krantz does not challenge the Division's 
interpretation of or application of section 61-2-11. Instead, 
Krantz challenges the ALJ's findings of fact. 
For example, Krantz argues that he did not act recklessly in 
the Stones transaction (Brief at 23) and that the Stones reliance 
on his promise was "unreasonable. (Brief at 25) Krantz also 
argues that the "Stones suffered no harm." (Brief at 26). All of 
theses issues pose questions of fact that should be reviewed by 
the court under the substantial evidence (based on the whole 
record) standard of review.1 
l
. As questions of fact, Krantz's arguments should be 
rejected on the grounds discussed above. Krantz's failure to 
marshall the evidence and provide this court with a complete record 
preclude him from contesting the ALJ's factual findings. 
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2. KRANTZ FAILURE TO DETERMINE WHETHER CSC COULD ASSUME 
THE STONES MORTGAGE CONSTITUTES A FALSE PROMISE. 
The ALJ's conclusion that Krantz made a false promise of a 
character likely to "influence, persuade or induce" was based on 
his finding that underlying facts satisfied certain elements of 
intentional or fraudulent misrepresentation as stated in several 
court decisions. Those elemencs were explained in Dugan v. Jones 
as follows: 
(1) a representation;(2)concerning a presently existing 
material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the 
representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made 
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge 
upon which to Dat>e such representation; (5) for the 
purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) 
that the other party acting reasonably and in Ignorance 
of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; '8) to 
his injury or damage* 
615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980), see also, Nikkelson v. Quail 
Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124, 126 (Utah 1982); Secor v. Knight, 
716 P.2d 790, 794 (Utah 1986). The ALJ found that there was 
substantial and credible evidence supporting the conclusion that 
Krantz made a false promise to Stones under the elements set 
forth in Dugan. (R./268-269). The ALJ found that Krantz made a 
representation to the Stones when he promised to assume their 
mortgage in the event the Stone's could not find another buyer. 
The ALJ also found that Krantz acted recklessly because he failed 
to determine under "what—if any—circumstances the loan could be 
assumed."(R./268) The ALJ also expressly found that the Stone's 
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reliance on Krantz was reasonable and that they were unaware of 
whether their loan could be assumed by CSC. (R./269) The ALJ 
also found that the Stone's suffered harm as a result of Krantz's 
representation. (R./2 6 9) 
3. KRANTZ HAD MORE THAN A DUTY TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH. 
Krantz contends that his sole duty to the Stones was to act 
in good faith when making the offer to assume the Stone's 
mortgage. (Brief at p.20) Krantz's argument and his reliance on 
Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608 (Utah 
*1982) for support of his contention are without merit. 
In Cerritos, the defendant, a owner of a warehouse, was sued 
by the plaintiffs for damages and specific performance of an 
option to purchase the defendant's warehouse. Id.. The defendant 
counter-sued on the basis of intentional and negligent 
misrepresentation claiming that the plaintiffs misrepresented to 
him that a third party, Fiber Sciences, planned to participate in 
the purchase and acquisition of the warehouse. Id,, at 611 The 
defendant argued that the price he agreed to under the option 
agreement was based on the plaintiff's representation that Fiber 
Sciences would participate in the purchase of the warehouse. Id. 
The defendant claimed that he was motivated to lower the price of 
the option based on a desire to curry favor with Fiber Sciences 
for the sake future business dealings with the company. Jld. at 
34 
610. The trial court granted plaintiffs and directed verdict and 
dismissed the defendant's claim. Jjd. at 611. 
The Cerritos court affirmed the trial court's directed 
verdict. The court ruled that with respect to the defendant's 
claim of intentional misrepresentation, that there was a lack of 
any evidence that the plaintiffs had not intention of keeping 
their agreement at the time it was made. Iji. The defendant also 
claimed that the plaintiff's engaged in a negligent 
misrepresentation by failing to first obtain a legal opinion that 
should have revealed a conflict of interest (whiuh latter 
evolved) which precluded Fiber Sciences from participating in the 
acquisition of the warehouse. .Id. The court noted, the 
defendant's reliance on Dugan as well as other cases in support 
of his legal argument that all of the elements of negligent 
misrepresentation were present. Id. at 612. 
The Cerritos court rejected defendant's application of Dugan 
and other cases on the basis that: "In those cases-the 
representation which was allegedly negligently made was a 
representation as to a past or present fact." j[d. The court then 
observed that there was no case law to support the defendant's 
proposition that negligent misrepresentation should be extended 
"to fact situations involving a person's [fiber science's] state 
of mind." Ld. At the time the plaintiff made the 
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misrepresentation to the defendant there did not exist a bona 
fide intention to participate in the purchase. Id. 
Cerritos can be distinguished from the Stone's transaction 
on the basis that Krantz's representation to assume the stones 
mortgage did involve a reckless misrepresentation of a presently 
existing material fact. Despite Krantz's argument that the 
contingent nature of the agreement excuses the inaccuracy of his 
representation, he misses the point. Krantz was not found to 
have intentionally misrepresented the facts to the Stones. 
(R./268) In fact the ALJ expressly found that Krantz and the 
Stones did not share a common intent over the manner in which CSC 
would assume the loan. (R./268) The Stone's anticipated that the 
assumption would be a formal assumption while the Krantz and CSC 
intended to assume the loan by a simple assumption. (R./264) 
Therefore, the mental state, or Krantz's good faith did not bear 
any relevance to the ALJ's decision. 
Krantz false promise to the Stones is not predicated on the 
failure of a condition to transpire, but the impossibility of the 
condition to transpire at the outset of the transaction. His 
failure to inquire of the loan's assumability resulted in the 
failure of the transaction and the resultant harm to the Stones. 
As a licensed real estate broker, Krantz owed a duty to the 
Stones to inquire first whether CSC could assume the Stone's 
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mortgage. By virtue of his training, experience and licensure, 
Krantz is held to higher standard than that of mere good faith. 
He is also required to act competently while conducting himself 
as a trained professional in the real estate business. "The law 
imposes upon [Krantz] a duty to reasonably assure the accuracy of 
what he represents, because of his superior position to obtain 
the needed knowledge and his pecuniary interest in the 
transaction." Galloway v. AFCO Development Corp., 777 P.2d 506, 
509 (Utah App. 1989.), Duqan at 1248. (a real estate agent is 
expected to be competent ar^ is answerable for beaches of 
statutory duty owed to the public.) 
Krantz is also not excused of his failure to inquire into 
the assumability of the Stone's loan because the Stone's had the 
option to void the transaction in the event, CSC could not assume 
the loan. The Stone's did in fact exercise their prerogative to 
void the agreement, but only because they could not qualify to 
purchase the home constructed by CSC due to their continued 
indebtedness on their existing mortgage on the condominium. 
(R./265) 
Krantz's breach of his professional standards as a real 
estate broker in the Stone's transaction served as an appropriate 
basis to enter a sanction against his license. The Division 
requests that the court uphold the decision of the Division 
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revoking Krantz's license to practice real estate. 
IV. KRANTZ MADE AN INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION IN 
THE GASTER TRANSACTION. 
In the Gaster transactions, the ALJ found that Krantz made 
two misrepresentations by omission. Like the Stones transaction, 
the facts in the Gaster transaction involved two separate 
agreements between the Gasters and CSC. The Gasters entered into 
an agreement wherein Krantz acted as the Gaster's agent in the 
sale of the Gaster home to CSC. (R./272) The Gaster's agreed in 
turn to purchase a home constructed by CSC The Gasters were 
represented in that transaction by an real estate agent referred 
to as Ms. Hill-Black. (R./272) 
The ALJ found that Krantz first misrepresentation occurred 
at closing on April 21, 1988. (R./273). Both transactions, the 
sale the Gaster's home to CSC, and the purchase of the new home 
constructed by CSC were closed on that date. (R./27 3) With 
respect to the closing on the Gaster's closing, the ALJ found 
that there were unpaid bills for labor and materials on the home 
constructed by CSC and Krantz intentionally failed to disclose 
the existence of the unpaid bills at the time of closing. 
(R./275). Shortly after the closing, two liens were attached to 
the Gaster's home. (R./274). The liens were subsequently 
discharged by CSC. Id. 
The second misrepresentation was found to have occurred 
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around June 1, 1988 when the first payment on the trust deed note 
was not paid.(R./274) When Mr. Gaster learned that payment on 
the note was delinquent he contacted Krantz who indicated that 
payment was made but not properly credited. (R./274) The ALJ 
expressly found that there was no substantial evidence to support 
Krantz's statement that payment was made. (R./274) A month later 
Mr. Gaster contacted Krantz a second time about payments not 
being made on the note. Krantz again represented that he would 
attempt to make the payments. (R./274). As a result of Krantz's 
misrepresentations and CSC's failure to make the necessary 
payments on the trust deed note, the Gasters were required to pay 
$8/750 to avoid foreclosure on the home and to relinquish all 
claims against the property. (R./274). 
1. INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER AGENT DOES NOT EXCUSE KRANTZ 
Krantz attempts to excuse his conduct on the assertion that 
Ms. Hill-Black, who acted as the Gaster's agent at the closing 
the purchase of the new home, should have protected the Gaster's 
from the possibility of mechanics liens. Essentially, Krantz is 
placing the blame on Ms. Hill Black for his misrepresentation. 
Krantz's assertion is without merit for three reasons. 
First, it difficult to fathom how Krantz can charge Ms. Black 
with a duty to discover what he, as a licensed broker, already 
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had actual knowledge of.2 Krantz was also was acting as an 
agent to the Gasters in the sale of their home to CSC. By his 
argument, Krantz is admitting that he had a conflict of interest 
between his duty to the Gasters as their agent and CSC. Krantz 
reacted to his dual by choosing not to reveal the unpaid bills to 
the Gasters (to their detriment). 
Second, Krantz's argument is totally inconsistent with the 
appellate court's ruling in several cases starting with Duqan. 
In this state, it is apparent that the rule of 
caveat emptor does not apply to those dealing with a 
licensed real estate agent. Though not occupying a 
fiduciary relationship with prospective purchasers, a 
real estate agent hired by the vendor is expected to be 
honest, ethical, and competent and is answerable at law 
for breaches of his or her statutory duty to the 
public. 
Duqan at 1248.; Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 795 (Utah 1986); 
Rogers v. Division of Real Estate. 790 P.2d 102, 107 (Utah App. 
1990). The legislature as seen fit to impose upon real estate 
licensees the duty to act honestly and ethically regardless of 
whether acting as an agent or "on his own account." Utah Code 
2
. Krantz argues that the ALJ held that Krantz was not aware 
of CSC's perilous financial situation until after closing. Krantz 
presumes that the ALJ's conclusion in that regard contradicts his 
later finding that Krantz's failure to disclose unpaid bills was 
intentional. While it is true that the ALJ found that Krantz was 
unaware of CSC's financial problems until after the closing, this 
is entirely different than the finding that Krantz new that bills 
for labor and materials on the Gaster home had not been paid for. 
This is yet another example where Krantz has failed to marshall the 
evidence to support his argument. 
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Ann. § 61-2-11 (1988). Krantz is neither excused by the fact 
that another agent was involved in the transaction nor by the 
assertion that his fiduciary obligation to the Gaster's 
terminated upon closing. (Brief at 31 and 34). 
Krantz further argues that any representation he made was 
not substantial because CSC paid off the liens on the Gaster's 
home. Krantz offers nothing except his own self-serving 
speculation that the transaction would have closed regardless of 
the misrepresentation because allegedly it would be to CSC's and 
the Gaster's detriment not to. (Brief at 30) While Krantz's 
statement may be true, if the Division were to indulge it its own 
speculation, we would point out that CSC could have been subject 
to professional discipline on its contractor's license and 
perhaps even criminal penalties if the liens were not discharged. 
This may have provided an added inducement to Krantz and CSC to 
pay off the liens. 
The Division was justified in revoking Krantz's license 
based on his misrepresentation at closing and his subsequent 
misrepresentations after closing regardless of his fiduciary 
obligation to the Gasters (which the Division vigorously 
maintains he still owed). As a licensed real estate broker, 
Krantz owes a general duty to the public to act ethically and 
competently. Krantz's clear and substantial breach of that duty 
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served as a sufficient basis for the Division to conclude that 
Krantz violated sections 61-2-11(1) (misrepresentation), 61-2-11 
(8)(being unworthy and incompetent) and 61-2-11(16)(breech of 
fiduciary duty)3, and justified the revocation of Krantz's 
license. 
The Division requests that the court uphold the decision of 
the Division of Real Estate revoking Krantz license to practice 
real estate. 
V. KRANTZ VIOLATED 61-2-20 BY USING A FORM NOT 
APPROVED BY THE COMMISSION OR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL. 
The ALJ found that Krantz used a real estate earnest money 
agreement form that was not approved by the Division or the 
Attorney General's Office. (R./270) Krantz contends that the 
language of section 61-2-20 is permissive and not prohibitory and 
does not apply to Krantz. (Brief at 33-34) Krantz's argument is 
warrants at most, a brief response. 
The Division asserts that section 61-2-20 is designed to 
allow real estate licensees to engage in practices that otherwise 
would constitute the unauthorized practice of law. Although 
Krantz's violation of this statute is perhaps not as serious as 
the other matters discussed above, the ALJ found sufficient 
evidence to conclude that Krantz was acting as a real estate 
3
. Apparently the ALJ mis-cited section 61-2-11(16). He cited 
61-2-12(16)(1988) . 
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licensee when he used forms, obtained from a friend (R./264), and 
thus violated the letter and intent of section 61-2-20. (R./270) 
Utah Code Ann. § (1988). 
VI. THE ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER 9 MONTHS AFTER THE 
HEARING DOES NOT WARRANT REVERSAL OF THE DIVISION'S 
ORDER. 
The recommended order issued by the Administrative was 
issued on March 18, 1992 and was subsequently affirmed and 
adopted by the Division Director and Real Estate Commission, 
April 8, 1992 during the regularly scheduled month meeting of the 
Commission. May 29-30 1991. Consequently, the order was issue a 
little less than 10 months after the hearing was concluded. 
Krantz argues that the delay in receiving the order caused him 
substantial prejudice because he "told his agents that the matter 
was pending, and they chose to move their licenses with other 
brokers." (Brief at 36) 
It is not difficult to fathom what the agents listed under 
Krantz would have done had the order been issued much sooner 
revoking his broker's license. Krantz has not suffered any 
prejudice from the delay in receiving the order. He maintained 
his license during the pendency of the order and continues to 
practice today under the stay order issued by this court. 
Other than Krantz's self serving statements, he has offered 
no proof that the delay caused him any harm to his professional 
43 
career above and beyond the natural consequences that flow from a 
disciplinary proceeding/ If anything the delay prevented the 
Division from performing its statutory role of protecting the 
public. 
In addition, other than Krantz's bald assertion, he contends 
that the delay may have tainted the ALJ's ability to make a 
decision. Without marshalling all of the evidence and providing 
this court with a complete record, Krantzrs assertion is nothing 
more than speculation. 
VII. THE COMMISSION AND THE D^ .-.SION DID NOT IMPOSE A 
BROADER SANCTION ON KRANTZ. 
Krantz contends that the decision of the Utah Real Estate 
Commission and the Division Director adopting the recommended 
order of the ALJ is vague because it imposes a broader sanction 
than the recommended order issued by the ALJ. (Brief at 37) 
Although the final order, signed by the Director and the 
Commission, contains the term, "Real Estate Licensee" (R./278) 
instead of the term "license to practice as real estate principal 
broker", it does not expand the scope of the recommended order. 
Krantz ignores the fact that he only has one license, the license 
A
. The hearing on this matter lasted two days and involved 
the testimony of numerous witnesses and exhibits. The Department 
of Commerce only employs one Administrative Law Judge to handle all 
adjudicative proceedings involving professional licensing, real 
estate and securities. Delays in the process are unfortunately a 
fact of life. 
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to practice as a principal broker. 
The revocation of Krantz's principal brokers license 
terminates the privilege of practicing in the profession of real 
estate. The order does not whittle down Krantz's license as a 
principle broker to that of a licensed sales agent. The 
revocation of his license spells an end to his practice in the 
profession until he applies and is issued a new license. Simply 
put, there is no issue before this court as there is no license 
at issue other than Krantz's principle broker's license. 
VIII. KRANTZ DID NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO RECONSIDERATION 
UNDER UAPA. 
Krantz asserts that section 63-46b-12(6)(c) "recognizes a 
right to apply for reconsideration with the Administrative Law 
Judge, with the Commission or with both." Section 63~46b-
12(6)(c)(vii) requires agencies to provide parties with "a notice 
of any right of further administrative reconsideration or 
judicial review available to aggrieved parties; and (viii) the 
time limits applicable to any appeal or review." Utah Code Ann. § 
(1989) . 
Krantz interpretation of the above quoted provisions is 
misplaced. Section 63-46b-13(l)(a) and not section 63-46b-12 is 
determinative on the issue of the availability of agency review. 
That section provides: 
(l)(a) Within 20 days after the date that an order is 
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issued for which review by the agency or by a superior 
agency under Section 63-46b-12 is unavailable, and if 
the order would otherwise constitute final agency 
action, any party may file a written request for 
reconsideration with the agency, stating the specific 
grounds upon which relief is requested, (emphasis 
added) 
Utah Code Ann. § (1989). Krantz was provided with a notice of 
his right to agency review by the Department of Commerce which 
serves as the superior agency to the Division of Real Estate. 
Krantz also availed himself of the that right before bringing 
this appeal. (R./345-352) Consequently, Krantz has not suffered 
any prejudice due a lack of notice of his ri^ Ivt to agency review 
under UAPA. 
IX. KRANTZ HAS NOT BEEN PREJUDICED BY THE DIVISION'S 
PRIOR PRACTICE. 
Krantz asserts that the Division deprive him of the 
opportunity to contest whether the Division was acting "contrary 
to the agency's prior practice" by not publishing the Division's 
prior handling of disciplinary matters. (Brief at 38-39) Krantz 
also argues that "[t]he public that the licensing law seeks to 
protect and licensees, too, have a right to learn from the 
misadventures of brokers an agents who run amiss with the law 
through complaints brought by the Division." (Brief at 39-40). 
It is hard to imagine given Krantzfs imputed knowledge of 
the Division's operations (and that of his counsel) how this 
argument can be made in good faith. The Division has published a 
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quarterly news letters (Exhibit "B") for about 10 years. 
Disciplinary matters are published as a matter of course in the 
publication of "UTAH REAL ESTATE NEWS". (Exhibit "B") Moreover, 
there are, and were in 1991, other avenues to gain access to past 
disciplinary matters such as through discovery requests and 
through a request of public documents from the Division. 
X. THE DIVISION DOES NOT HAVE TO ESTABLISH 
COMPREHENSIVE REGULATIONS THAT ADDRESS EVERY 
CONCEIVABLE ISSUE. 
Krantz argues that the Division's rules are not sufficiently 
comprehensive to put licensed real estate agents on notice of 
what is expected of them. (Brief at 40-44) Krantz even goes so 
far to say the ALJ failure to cite to rules in support of his 
legal conclusions "should be sufficient grounds for this court to 
investigate the adequacy of the Division's regulations." (Brief 
at 40). Finally, Krantz argues that the Division's failure to 
provide comprehensive regulations denied his client due process. 
It is uncertain whether Krantz is requesting a declaratory 
order from the court or simply taking a shot gun approach on this 
appeal. These issues were never raised during the proceedings 
below and were not raised in Krantz's docketing statement. The 
Division objects to these broad and unsupported arguments from 
being raised on the first time on appeal. Preservation of issues 
applies to administrative proceedings as well as with regular 
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trial courts. Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 
(1990). 
As Krantz correctly pointed out, this court in In Re Topik 
held that the statutory terms "unworthy and incompetent" found in 
section 61-2-11 were not unconstitutionally vague or indefinite. 
761 P.2d 32 (Utah App. 1988). The court found that the terms 
"unworthy and incompetent" were comparable to the statutory term 
"unprofessional conduct" as used in the physicians licensing 
laws. Citing to Vance v. Fordham, 761 P.2d 124, the Topik court 
agreed that the terms unworthy and incompetent provic. i 
sufficient notice to the licensee for the following reasons: 
(1) The subject of professional performance is too 
comprehensive to be codified in detail. (2) Members of 
a profession can properly be held to understand its 
standards of performance. (3) Standards of performance 
will be interpreted by members of the same profession 
in the process of administrative adjudications. 
Id.3 
Krantz cannot excuse his own alleged lack of awareness of 
the professional standards governing real estate agents, nor can 
he speak for other licensed real estate professionals as he 
attempts to do in his brief. (Brief at 43-44) It is no defense 
to Krantz's conduct underlying this action that real estate 
5
. Let me apologize for the lack of a proper cite to the page 
numbers. The only copy of the case available is the original copy 
of the opinion. 
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agents lack the sophistication of doctors or that the Division 
fails to provide sufficient education for licensees. (Brief at 
43-44). 
Under the standards set forth in Vance and Topik, Krantz has 
not established any violation of his rights to State and Federal 
due process by virtue of the Commissions failure to enact 
comprehensive regulations concerning professional conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
Krantz has raised numerous issues including numerous issues 
challenging the factual findings of the administrative law judge. 
However, it attempting to challenge the factual findings of the 
administrative law judge, Krantz has failed to marshall the 
evidence and provide the court with an adequate record from which 
to review this case. The Division requests that the court 
presume that Division's factual findings are supported by 
substantial evidence and that its application of its laws to the 
facts is both rationale and reasonable. The Division's order 
revoking Krantz's license to practice real estate should be 
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affirmed. Moreover, Krantz's request for attorney fees should be 
denied. 
Submitted this day of December, 1992 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
^ , certify that on <jU*4*1 Jy //~&Z 
I served two copies of the foregoing RESPONDENTS' BRIEF to 
Thomas F. Rogan, counsel for Petitioner in this matter, by 
mailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient postage 
prepaid to the following address: 
THOMAS F. ROGAN 
136 S. Main Street, #325 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
STATE OF UTAH 
AUG211992/ 
Mary .\conan» 
Cle* c? :^e Court 
Utah Ccun CT Appals 
In the Matter of the License 
of Randy R. Krantz to Act as 
Real Estate Principal Broker 
CERTIFICATE THAT TRANSCRIPT 
IS NOT REQUIRED 
Case # RE87-11-19 
Case # RE89-03-12 
App. Ct. # 920487-CA 
On this 21st day of August, 1992, the undersigned attorney, 
Thomas F. Rogan, certifies on behalf of the respondent, Randy R. 
Krantz, that no transcript will be requested in the above en-
titled case. 
ThP undersigned certifies that on this day he has mailed by 
first-class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, a copy of this Certifi-
cate to Blaine E. Twitchell, Director, Division of Real Estate, 
and Shelley K. Wismer, Staff Legal Counsel, Division of Real 
Estate, at P. 0. Box 45802, Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0802, and 
to R. Paul Van Dam, Utah Attorney General, c/o Robert E. Steed, 
Assistant Attorney General, 36 South State Street, Suite 1100, 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111, and David W. Lund, Assistant Attorney 
General, 236 State CapitoL Building, Salt Lake 
Counsel's Address: 
Counsel's Phone: 
136 South Main Ste^St, Suite 325 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
801-355-0461 
EXHIBIT "B 
Utah Real Estate 
A publication for Utah's real estate 
professionals. NEWS 
fune, 1992 Volume 22 - Number 2 
HANDLING FUNDS 
FOR CLIENTS 
As a real estate agent or broker, 
jreat confidence is placed in you by 
buyers as they entrust their earnest 
noney funds to you. How well you 
landle those funds is determined by 
/our professionalism in knowing the 
law, the Administrative Rules, the 
Dffice policies and your compliance 
with them. 
The Division has received too 
many complaints pertaining to the 
improper handling of "other peoples" 
money. Even one complaint from 
this state's licensed professionals 
may be considered "too many." For 
example, agents have receipted for 
money that the agent did not receive 
or was to receive at some future date. 
Agents have failed to turn in the 
earnest money to the broker in a 
timely manner or the broker has 
failed to deposit the funds into the 
Real Estate Trust Account within the 
required time limit Some brokers, 
primarily in property management 
accounts, have failed to use the Trust 
Account and have deposited only to 
an operating account from which all 
expenses, mortgage payments and 
funds forwarded to the owner have 
been paid. In many of these cases 
the rental funds from one property 
have been used to make the mort-
gage payments or expenses on 
another. There has also been a rash 
of Trust Account violations where 
commissions were withdrawn from 
had closed or money withdrawn and 
used for personal use. In some cases 
the broker was certain that the trans-
action would close, but ended up 
being disappointed and short the 
earnest money when it failed. 
^ e law and the Administ -?five 
Rules are explicit regarding the 
handling of money held in trust for 
others. If you do not know or are not 
acquainted with them, you should 
get a copy of the law and the rules 
and become familiar with them. 
You should also attend one of the 
Real Estate Trust Account Seminars. 
They are presented monthly at the 
Heber M. Wells Building in Salt 
Lake. The seminar has also been 
presented recently in St. George, 
Cedar City, Richfield and Roosevelt 
Plans are being made to make pres-
entations in other areas of the state 
along with plans for increased trust 
account auditing. 
Remember, the real estate license 
(and especially the brokers license) 
was granted on the basis that the 
licensee possessed the attributes of 
"honesty, integrity, truthfulness, 
reputation, and competency" as 
stated in the law. These qualities 
should always be kept foremost in 
mind as you work with clients and 
handle their funds. Do not lose vour 
license from lack of knowledge or 
the pressure of a weak 
by Blaine Twitchell, 
Division Director 
moment when you need additional 
money and decide that the trust 
account is a good source. There will 
always be a need or desire for more 
money, but is the price you may pay 
worth it? There are some licensees 
that the Division and the Real Estate 
Commission have had to take action 
against whc *vill answer that ques-
tion with a resounding HiQ! Hope-
fully you will too. 
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2 Utah Real Estate News CORE COURSE - WHAT WE'VE LEARNED, 
WHERE WE'RE GOING 
by the Division of Real Estate 
la* y Utah licensees have had the 
pportunity to view the Core Course 
ideo tape this last year. Each 
censee has completed an evaluation 
)im on the video tape, and those 
valuations have been reviewed and 
nalyzed by the Division staff. 
is with most evaluations of any 
ducation course, some have been 
ositive and some negative. But the 
Comments" sections have proved to 
e invaluable in planning for the 
392-93 Core Course. 
ive Instructors vs. Video? 
Tie first big decision to make for the 
uture was whether or not to use live 
nstructors for the Core Course 
nstead of providing the education on 
'ideo tape. Many of the comments 
ed us to believe that the video tape 
vas frustrating for the viewers who 
lad no-one of whom to ask a ques-
ion. There were also abuses of the 
video classes, in that some enlight-
ened licensees brought lap-top 
computers or video games to play 
with, or books to read during the 
presentation. 
On the other hand, with a live 
instructor the licensee would have to 
wait until an instructor was available 
or willing to come into the commu-
nity with a class. Also, using a live 
instructor would increase the cost of 
the course by triple or quadruple, 
depending on how far the instructor 
would have to travel and depending 
on the instructor fee. 
As we struggled with the decision, 
the local boards of Realtors from the 
smaller communities (who were 
acting as course providers in their 
areas) pleaded with us not to give up 
on the video. We heard from the 
licensees-board members and non-
board members-in the outlying 
areas who said the same thing. They 
wanted the cost and the flexibility of 
the video! 
Facing the distance some licensees 
have to travel for education is a very 
real issue to which the Division 
needs to be sensitive. Also, if an 
outlying area needs to wait until a 
live instructor can come to town, the 
licensees in that area lose consider-
able flexibility as to when they can 
get their education. And it doesn't 
seem right that they should have to 
pay more for their education than 
someone living along the Wasatch 
Front who has easy and relatively 
inexpensive access to a variety of 
classes. 
A Better and More Complete 
Workbook? 
On the evaluations, there were many 
complaints that the graphics in the 
Continued on page 5 
Trust Account Seminar 
Registration 
The Trust Account Seminar has had 
jood reviews and attendance. The 
seminar is currently being held every 
nonth. Some classes have had as 
nany as 47 and some as few as 17. 
In order for a licensed person to 
-egister for the seminar, please mail 
/our $5.00 fee and a note indicating 
he date you plan to attend, your full 
lame, address, phone number and your 
Jcense number. Unlicensed people 
should mail the $5.00 fee with their 
lame, address, phone number and 
indicate that they are unlicensed. 
There is no refund or transferring of 
TT\ 
U d g w t : 
Account 
Numb** 
TranMcfon 
you are unable to attend after you have 
paid the fee. You will need to submit 
another$5.00 fee and information with 
the date you plan to attend. 
About a week before the seminar the 
Division will mail a ticket with the 
date, time, address and room number 
of the seminar. If you have not re-
ceived your ticket within a week be-
fore the seminar, give us a call to 
confirm that you are registered. 
A three hour continuing education 
certificate will be given to licensees 
who have attended the required 90% 
1 
TRUST ACCOUNT 
SEMINAR 
The seminar will cover the 
Administrative Rules for Trust Accounts 
established under the Utah Real Estate 
license law. 
Location: Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
530-6747 
JulySV92 9:00-12:00 noon 
August 7, '92 9:00-12:00 noon 
September 11, '92 9:00-12:00 noon 
3 hours CE credit 
To register, please send $5.00 requesting 
your preferred date to: 
Division of Real Estate 
PO Box 45806 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0806 
You will be issued a ticket for admission. 
If you park under the building, park in 
METERED areas only or you will be 
tirlri»t*H 
June 1992 
Disciplinary Sanctions 
3 
All Year Paradise, Inc., Developer of Powder 
Ridge Village timeshares. Agreed to refrain 
from the practices alleged in the Division's 
Petition dated August 21,1991, or the devel-
oper's registration to sell timeshare interests in 
Utah will be revoked. The Petition alleged that 
the developer made payments on contracts which 
had been rescinded by purchasers, failed to 
forward contract payoffs to a lender, and re-
wrote delinquent purchase contracts in order to 
inflate its line of credit which was based on the 
amount of current, non-delinquent contracts. 
#RE90-11-17. 
Gubler, Steven L., Order issued May 30,1991 
permanently enjoining him from selling, offer-
ing to sell, or making other disposition of inter-
ests in subdivided land in the Apple Valley 
Subdivision in Washington County, Utah until 
such time as he either registers those lands with 
the Division or obtains an exemption from 
registration. #RE90-ll-09. 
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Krantz, Randy R., Principal Broker, Copper 
State Realty. After a formal hearing, Krantz's 
license was revoked based on making a sub-
stantial misrepresentation, making a false prom-
ise, violating the licensing chapter, being un-
worthy or incompetent to act as a licensee in 
such manner to protect the public, and breach-
ing a fiduciary duty owed to aprincipal. Krantz 
promised that Copper State Construction, a 
company in which he was also a principal, 
would assume a loan on a condominium al-
though he did not know whether the company 
could do so. In a separate transaction in which 
Copper State Construction built a new home 
and took an existing home in trade, Krantz 
failed to disclose to the purchasers of the new 
home that subcontractors and materialmen had 
not been paid, and failed to keep them informed 
that payments were not made on their trade-in 
home, causing the loan to go into default. Krantz 
has requested agency review, which has stayed 
the revocation pending the outcome on review. 
#RE89-03-12. 
Menaker, Gary, Wilderness Properties, LTD., 
and Mammoth View Ranch, Cease and Desist 
Order issued Feb. 7,1992 prohibiting sales of 
subdivided land in Garfield County, Utah until 
such time as the land is properly registered with 
the Division of Real Estate under the provisions 
of the Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices Act 
#RE92-02-01. 
O'Brien, Gary, Principal Broker, OBPM, and 
Certified Instructor at OBrien School of Real 
Estate. After a formal hearing, O'Brien's real 
estate license and real estate instructor certifi-
cation were placed on probation until Nov. 12, 
1992 based on conviction of a criminal offense 
involving moral turpitude. OBrien was con-
victed of Attempted Forgery of a boat title. 
#RE90-ll-23. 
Reynolds, Douglas S., Principal Broker, Har-
bor Place Management. Consented to a revoca-
tion, with the revocation stayed and his license 
placed on probation for five years on the condi-
tion that he reconstructs the brokerage records 
he should have maintained for the years 1989 to 
date accounting for all funds received as prop-
erty manager during that time. The recon-
structed records are to be submitted to a CPA 
for verification. If the CPA's report shows 
fraud or misappropriation of funds, the stay will 
be lifted and the revocation imposed. Reynolds 
routinely commingled client funds with his 
own and deposited client funds into, and made 
disbursements from, an operating account. He 
routinely made disbursements from pooled 
funds on individual clients' expenses before 
revenue had been collected on the specific 
accounts of those clients. In some instances, 
disbursement checks were refused due to insuf-
ficient funds. #RE89-11-01. 
Tamarack Holdings, Inc., Cease and Desist 
Order issued December 9, 1991 prohibiting 
Tamarack Holdings, Inc. from offering or sell-
ing the Kona Reefshare in this state until such 
time as it is properly registered with the Divi-
sion under the provisions of the UtahTimeshare 
and Camp Resort Act. #RE91-12-02. 
Turner, Gilbert R., formerly principal broker 
of Turner Company Real Estate. Consented to 
a revocation of his broker's license and the 
issuance of a sales agent license on probation in 
its place, based on violation of U.C.A. Section 
61-2-11(6), failing to account for or remit 
monies, or commingling or diverting funds, 
andU.C.A.$ection61-2-ll(10),failingtokeep 
and make records available to the Division. 
Turner withdrew a $5,000.00 earnest money 
deposit from his trust account and used it for his 
own purposes. #RE91-06-14. 
Test Date 
January 1992 
February 1992 
March 1992 
April 1992 
May 1992 
Prepensing Exam Results 
Brokers 
Taken Passed 
21 10 
15 7 
33 18 
22 7 
28 14 
Salesagents 
Taken Passed 
218 121 
251 190 
214 136 
222 132 
240 149 
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BROKER 
ALERT 
The Division has 
received a report about 
an out-of-state 
company which has 
been attempting to defraud real 
estate brokers in our state. Typi-
cally, this company contacts a 
broker by phone and claims to 
represent bankers and lenders who 
need an "exclusive broker" in the 
local area to market foreclosures. 
Usually the broker is asked to 
send a check for $395.00 (or more) 
to the company by overnight mail, 
or sometimes the company will 
arrange for the payment to be 
picked up at the brokerage. The 
broker is then furnished a list of 
referrals. In the case which came 
to our attention, the referral list was 
bogus. The properties either were 
not foreclosures, not for sale, or did 
not exist 
We do not mean to imply that all 
out-of-state companies involved in 
referral programs are suspect. 
However, it is always good practice 
when you are contacted by some-
one claiming to be an out-of-state 
broker to contact the licensing 
agency of the other state and 
inquire about whether the broker is 
in fact licensed and whether there 
has been any disciplinary action 
taken against the broker. 
If you have been contacted by an 
out-of-state company and have 
been asked to pay money for 
referrals, or if you have had any 
problems similar to those outlined 
in this article, please contact the 
Division. We will forward any 
Emphasis on Agency -
Residential and Commercial 
As licensees have been struggling 
for the last five years with"Agency" 
and "Agency Disclosure", it has 
become more and more evident here 
at the Division that the majority of 
licensees-brokers and salesagents 
alike-are still extremely confiised as 
to what it all means. 
Dual Agency (isn't this an oxymo-
ron?) is the most misunderstood 
form of agency. We see our licen-
sees getting into trouble and into an 
Undisclosed Dual Agency situation 
because they don't understand at 
what point the buyer crosses over the 
line from being a customer into 
being a client. 
Our licensees are confused when 
acting as a Buyer's Agent when they 
think the signed agency disclosure 
statement serves as a buyer agency 
contract 
Licensees acting as a Seller's 
Agent (the listing agent) don't 
understand the problems inherent 
when offering sub-agency either 
through the MLS or some other 
cooperating broker situation. 
And Disclosed Dual Agency is not 
well understood when the licensee 
doesn't understand the limitations on 
It's no wonder everyone is con-
fused! But help is near! 
The focus for both pre-licensing 
and post-licensing education is going 
to emphasize AGENCY for the next 
year. Each issue of the newsletter 
will have an article on Agency in it. 
The Core Course will be comprised 
mostly of Agency and how to 
practice Agency without killing the 
deal. 
The sales trainers in the larger 
companies will be receiving some 
specialized training so they can take 
the message back to their companies. 
And the pre-licensing and continuing 
education instructors will receive the 
same intensive training. If the 
instructors/trainers are confused, 
then their students surely will be 
also. 
The goal is to make certain that all 
trainers and instructors are on the 
same wave length, and that they are 
all teaching the same material. 
There will be many courses on 
Agency offered throughout the state 
this coming year. 
If you are confused (and even if 
you're not confused), this will be the 
year to get some good courses on 
Agency. Don't let yourself get 
caught in an ugly lawsuit because 
vnn riirliVt understand what was 
une 1992 
CORE COURSE - WHAT 
WE'VE LEARNED, 
WHERE WE'RE GOING 
'ontinuedfrom page 2 
ideo were not left on the screen 
ong enough for someone to copy the 
nformation down. If the same 
visual was not in the workbook, then 
t was lost 
licensees also felt that the workbook 
vas not complete enough and didn't 
eave them with enough information 
o use later on. 
n the future we will make certain 
hat every visual in the video will 
low also be duplicated in the work-
wok. The instructor's outline will 
ilso be provided so that the licensee 
.vill end up with some beneficial 
^ference material. 
Why Not Make It a Professional 
Production? 
Many viewers thought we had set up 
a home video camera to make the 
Core Course video. Nothing could 
be further from the truth. 
In the quest for a first-rate produc-
tion, the facilities and expertise of 
the Instructional Media Department 
at the University of Utah were used. 
It was definitely not a home produc-
tion. 
However, some important lessons 
were learned about the graphics and 
the timing of the graphics. We hope 
to make those transitions smoother 
in the future. 
A Live Class? 
Even though there was an audience 
during the presentation, it was so 
small there was no interaction 
between the students and teachers. 
That problem will be remedied for 
the next production by making 
certain there is a full, interactive 
class. Hopefully this class will ask 
most of the same questions that 
another class would ask, and this 
will help satisfy some of the frustra-
tion of the video-viewers who are 
not able to ask questions. 
Better a^^ Better 
As much as we all like to think we 
have all the answers, there's nothing 
quite like having mistakes and faults 
pointed out to you. 
Many thanks to all of you who took 
the time to give constructive criti-
cism. Hopefully most of those ideas 
will be able to be incorporated into 
the next video. 
We rely on the viewers of the video 
to tell us what works and what 
doesn't. By turning "mistakes" into 
"learning experiences", we can only 
be better and better. 
! * • • • • • • m 
In Memoriam 
The Division of Real Estate would like to express condo-
lences to the families of the following real estate licensees 
who have recently passed away: \ 
Betty N. Atkinson W Jordan 
^ Jack W. Bowen St George 
V Joann B. DeHaast Provo 
D. Blayne Morrill Whiterocks 
Karla K. Rawlings Lewiston 
ErcellL.Sell 
F. T. Wetzel 
. t 
Bountiful * Jr Salt Lake %* 
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What Classes Can I 
Take for Continuing 
Education? 
Course work taken to satisfy the 
continuing education requirementmust 
have been previously certified for that 
purpose. The certified courses must 
also serve to meet the education re-
quirement of protection of the public. 
What about courses taken out of state? 
The law does allow a licensee to get 
credit for a course which has been 
taken out of state. The course needs to 
have been already certified in the other 
state for continuing education, and the 
subject matter needs to deal with the 
issue of protection of the public. 
An application form is available at 
the Division for those persons wishing 
to apply for credit for out of state 
courses. There is a fee of $35.00 for 
each course review, and the licensee 
needs to allow a minimum of 60 days 
after the application is received at the 
Division offices for it to be reviewed 
and approved. 
What about college courses? 
There are some college courses that 
have already been approved for con-
tinuing education, but just because it is 
a college course doesn't mean that it 
will have automatic continuing educa-
tion approval. 
What about retaking a pre-licensing 
class for continuing education? 
Here again, if the pre-licensing class 
has had prior approval to serve as both 
pre-licensing and continuing educa-
tion, credit can be had for that kind of 
a class. But there must be prior ap-
The National Association of 
Real Estate License Law Officials 
THE 1992 "DIGEST OF REAL ESTATE 
LAWS" is a reference guide of license law 
statistics. Designed for real estate execu-
tive officers, educators, attorneys and 
those in need of state-by-state statistics 
on license law requirements. Information 
contained in the "DIGEST" has been used 
extensively in testifying and lobbying be-
fore legislative bodies throughout the 
United States and Canada. This guide is 
up-dated annually and the statistics con-
tained change considerably from year to 
year. Sign up today for the Digest. 
SEND TODAY FOR "THE DIGEST OF REAL ESTATE LICENSE LAWS' 
NAME. PHONE NUMBER ( ). 
FIRM NAME. 
ADDRESS-
CITY 
DATE. 
STATE. ZIP. 
D I have enclosed $30 00 payment for the "DIGEST OF REAL ESTATE LICENSE LAWS". 
Bill my D VISA D Master Card # Expiration 
D Put me on the subscription list for "The 1993 Digest of Real Estate License Laws." 
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7 
gham City/Tremonton Board of Realtors 
Pre-Registration 
Zolleen Reeve 723-5590 
rbon/Emery Board of Realtors - Price 
Pre-Registratlon 
Leanna Axelgard 637-7500 
w Mary Bishop 637-6559 
ntral Utah Board of Realtors - Richfield 
Pre-Regist ration 
Julie Curtis 896-8261 
eater Ogden Area Association of Realtors 
August 19 9:00-12:00 "Core Course" 
1:00-4:00 "Risk Reduction" 
Location: Ogden Bd. of Realtors Office 
2748 Adams Ave., Ogden 
Pre-Regist ration 
Kassi 399-9273 
an County Board of Realtors - Cedar City 
Location: TBA 
Pre-Registration 
Steve Cony 586-2525 
ogan Board of Realtors 
October 22 9:00-12:00 "Core Course" 
AND 1:00-4:30 "Core Course" 
Location: Logan City Offices 
255 N. Main - Conference Room 
Logan 
Pre-Registration 
Cara Brewer 753-1044 
ioab 
Pre-Registration 
Doug McElhenny 259-6493 
ark City Board of Realtors 
Pre-Registration 
*iiQ-4119 
Salt Lake City 
2nd & 4th Thursdays 6:30-9:30 Finance 22 
"Core Course" 
at BOTH locations: Cedar Park/U of U 
5286 S. 320 W..SLC 
and Bountiful U of U 
Stoker School 
75 E. 200 S., Bountiful 
Pre-Registration 
U of U Correspondence Study 581-6472 
Salt Lake City 
Location: Salt Lake Community College 
South Campus 
1575 S. State 
Salt Lake City 
Pre-Registration 
Gary Pickering 943-9608 
Salt Lake City 
Spencer Real Estate Education 
Location: 4476 South 450 West, #B 
Salt Lake 
Pre-Registration 268-3355 
Salt Lake City 
Stringham Real Estate School 
Location: 5258 Pinemont Dr, B-160 
.Salt Lake 
Pre-Registration 269-8889 
Salt Lake City 
C-21 of the Rocky Mountains 
June 15 5:00-8:00 "Core Course" 
July 27 5:00-8:00 "Core Course" 
Aug 17 5:00 - 8:00 "Core Course" 
Location: 4001 South 700 East, #21 
Salt Lake 
Pre-Registration 
Jim Curtis 268-2148 
Tooele Board of Realtors 
Pre-Registration 
Bill Allsop 882-5590 
Uintah Basin Board of Realtors - Vernal 
Pre-Registration 
ftcrri Shnckev 789-2390 
Utah County Board of Realtors - Provo/Orem 
3rd Friday of Each Month 
1:004:00 "Risk Reduction" 
4th Friday of Each Month 
1:00-400 "Core Course" 
Location: Utah Co. Bd. of Realtors Office 
901 S. Orem Blvd., Orem 
Pre-Registration (Limited Seating) 
Deborah 226-3777 
Wasatch County Board of Realtors 
Heber City 
Pre-Registration 
Lauren Williams 654-2250 
Washington County Board of Realtors 
S t George 
July 16 9:00 -12:00 "Risk Reduction" 
Location: Washington Co. Bd. Office 
90 E. 100 S., Ste 101, St. George 
Pre-Registration 
Christy Hadey 628-7374 
Please contact the Board/Area 
person directly at the phone number that 
has been provided. You cannot pre-regis-
ter with the Division. 
CONTINUING 
EDUCATION 
UPDATE 
JUNE 1992 
(Continued on page 8) 
f 
Shepherd School of Real Estate 
2780 Madison Ave 
Ogden, UT 84403 
Bill and Jean Shepherd 
801-393-1422 
or Gary Pickering 
801-943-9608 
#91-05-02 Core Course 3hrs 
Every Saturday afternoon 
#92-01-04 Real Estate Finance 
1 st S aturday each month 3 hrs 
#92-01-05 Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
2nd Saturday each month 3 hrs 
#92-01-06 Agency Disclosure 
3rd Saturday each month 3 hrs 
#92-05-06 Appraisal-Cost Replacement 
MA,V»M 3 hrs 
8 
/Salt"] 
Utah Real Estate News 
Salt Lake Community College 
South Campus 
1575 S. State 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
Gary Pickering 
801-943-9608 
#92-01-04 Real Estate Finance 
2nd Thursday each month 3 hrs 
#92-01-05 Earnest Money Sales Agreement] 
3rd Thursday each month 3 hrs 
#92-01-06 Agency Disclosure 
4th Thursday each month 3 hrs 
#92-05-06 Appraisal-Cost 
^ Replacement Method 3 hrs
 v 
/Salt Lake Board of Realtors 
2970 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
Shelley Reed 
801-486-4465 
#92-04-08 Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement 1.5 hrs 
#91-07-04 Real Estate Finance 3 hrs 
#92-02-11 Fair Housing & Equal 
Opportunity 3 hrs 
^#92-02-12 Realtors Code of Ethics 3 hrsj 
'Stringham Real Estate School 
5258 S. Pinemont Dr., Suite B-160 
Salt Lake City, UT 84123 
Arnold or Martell Stringham 
801-269-8889 
The following courses are on video tape 
with a test/workbook required. The dates 
and times are flexible. 
#91-10-02 HP Calculator 3 hrs 
#92-03-08 Contracts I 2 hrs 
#92-03-09 Contracts II 2 hrs 
#92-03-10 Agency I 2 hrs 
#92-03-11 Agency H 2 hrs 
#92-03-12 Listings & Options 2 hrs 
#92-03-13 Finance I 2 hrs 
#92-03-14 Finance II 2 hrs 
#92-03-15 Finance III 2 hrs 
#92-03-16 Finance IV 2 hrs 
#92-03-17 Mortgage Law 2 hrs 
#92-03-18 Appraisal I 2 hrs 
#92-03-19 Appraisal II 2 hrs 
#92-03-20 Appraisal HI 2 hrs 
#92-03-21 Earnest Money I 2 hrs 
#92-03-22 Earnest Money II 2 hrs 
#92-03-23 Utah Law I 2 hrs 
#92-03-24 Utah Lawn 2hrs 
#92-03-25 Utah Law m 2 hrs 
#92-03-26 Utah Law IV 2 hrs 
#92-03-27 Utah Law V 2 hrs 
#92-03-28 Financial Controls 1 hr 
#92-03-29 Taxation lhr 
Residential Sales Council 
430 North Michigan Ave. 
Chicago, IL 60611-4092 
Lois Zurella 
312-321-4441 
#92-02-14 RS 205-Financial Skills for 
the Residential Specialist 16 hrs 
#92-06-01 Making Money Selling & 
REAL ESTATE 
CONTINUING 
EDUCATION 
CERTIFIED PROVIDERS 
JUNE 1992 
Please contact the providers for their 
individual schedules of courses. 
Division of Real Estate 
PO Box 45806 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0806 
801-530-6747 
#92-04-04 Trust Account Seminar 
July 10 3 hrs 
August 7 3 hrs 
/The Hunt School 
257 North Donlee Drive 
St. George, UT 84770 
Bonnie Hunt May 
801-673-9721 
#91 -10-05 Conventional & Government 
V Financing Programs 6 hrs J 
S * 
Spencer Real Estate School 
4476 S. 450 W.,SuB 
Murray, UT 84123 
Lorenzo Spencer 
801-268-3355 
#91-12-04 Utah Law I, n ,m, IV 8 hrs 
#92-01-06 
#92-01-07 
#92-01-08 
#92-01-09 
#92-03-04 
#92-03-05 
\#92-03-06 
Utah Law I 
Utah LawII 
Utah Law m 
Utah Law IV 
Earnest Money I 
Earnest Money II 
Agency 
2hrs 
2hrs 
2hrs 
2hrs 
2hrs 
2hrs 
2hrs ) 
~\ /Sky View Publications Inc. 
136 S. Main, Suite 325 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Tom Rogan 
801-355-0462 
#92-04-05 RE Case Law lhr 
#92-04-06 RE Case Law lhr 
#91-08-02 "What You Don't Know May 
Hurt You - Recent Utah Cases Dealing 
with Commercial Real Estate" 3 hrs 
#91-10-04 Building a Foundation for 
Risk Reduction: Avoiding Fraud, 
Misrepresentation & the Unauthorized 
s^  Practice of Law 3hrs ^ 
Roger T. Beattie, Inhouse Training 
3039 S. 600 W. 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Roger Beattie 
801-298-7111 
#91-12-05 Real Estate Investment 
Analysis 8 hrs 
#91 -12-06 Property M anagement 
FiinHflm*»ntfllc 4 llTS 
/Success Siminars 
7832 N. LaCanada Dr 
Tucson, AZ 85704 
#92-01-19 
VUp-Date 
Residential Finance 
3 hrs 
/Department of Business - SUU 
351 West Center St. 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
Alan Hamlin 
801-586-5417 
#91-07-02 "Lending Fundamentals-How 
V to Get the Bank to Say Yes" 3 hrs J 
/Randal K. Eagar 
5200 Highland Dr. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
801-272-9686 
#92-04-07 Power Prospecting & I 
y Presentations 2.5hrsy 
/National Association of Realtors 
777 -14th Street NW 
Washington, D.C. 20005-3271 
Robert Hammond 
Convention Education Coordinator 
#92-NAR-01 Fair Housing in the 90's -
Rental 3 hrs 
#92-NAR-02 Financing the Home 
Purchase 3 hrs 
#92-NAR-03 Expand Your Market: 
International Real Estate 3 hrs 
#92-NAR-04 Todays Tools for 
Commercial Leasing 3 hrs 
#92-NAR-05 Outlook for Risk 
v Reduction 3 hrs 
"Gerald Crawford 
819Woodmoor 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
801-534-1911 
^#91-10-06 Cover Your Agency 4 hrs 
/Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund 
645 S. 200 E., Ste 102 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Stephanie Harper 
801-328-8229 
#91-12-01 Professional Liability & Real 
V^ Estate Transactions 4hrs J 
/Mountain Fuel Supply Co. 
180 E. 100 S. 
PO Box 11368 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
Stephen Denison 
801-534-5588 
#91-12-02 Marketing Energy Efficient 
V^ Homes 3hrs J 
/National Business Institute, Inc. 
PO Box 3067 
Eau Claire, WI54702 
Jamie Larscheid 
715-835-8525 
une 1992 9 
Commercial Investment 
Real Estate Institute 
430 North Michigan 
Chicago, IL 60611 
Aida Wahmann 
312-321-4460 
#92-01-11 CI 101: Financial Analysis for 
Commercial Real Estate 32 hrs 
#92-01-12 Q 201: Market Analysis for 
Commercial Real Estate 32 hrs 
#92-01-13 Q 301: Decision 
Analysis 
#92-01-14 Q 401: Intro to 
Commercial RE Analysis 32 hrs 
#92-01-15 Q 402: Intro to 
Commercial Brokerage 
#92-01-16 Q 404: Advanced Tax 
Planning for Commercial RE 27 hrs 
#92-01-17 CI 405: Selling 
Commercial RE 12 hrs 
#92-01-18 CI 406: Negotiating 
Workshop for Commercial 
Real Estate 12 hrs 
#92-01 -21 CI 407: Advanced Techniques 
in Marketing Commercial RE 27 hrs 
f N 
Utah Association of Realtors 
5710 South Green Street 
Salt Lake City, frf °4123 
Dee McRae 
801-268-4747 
32 hrs 
27 hrs 
#92-02-07 
#91-10-01 
#91-08-01 
#92-02-05 
#92-02-06 
#91-05-05 
Seminar 
#91-07-01 
GRI 200 
GRI 300 
GRI 400 
GRI 500 
GRI 600 
16hrs 
16hrs 
16 hrs 
3hrs 
16hrs 
Environmental Hazards 
3 hrs 
Application of the HP 
Calculator. Basic 
#92-05-03 
Right 
#92-05-04 
Intermediate 
Advanced 
2hrs 
4hrs 
4hrs 
Get the Listing - Priced 
3hrs 
Seven Deadly Sins of 
Qualifying Buyers 3hrs 
Real Estate Specialists 
201 East St. George Blvd. 
St. George, UT 84770 
Jim Coleman 
801-628-1606 
#92-02-08 Listing & Earnest Money 
Sales Agreements - The Path to 
Your Bank 3 hrs 
#92-02-09 Agency, Ethics & 
, RE Roulette 6 hrs 
Lefavi Financial Center 
1245 E. Brickyard Rd, Ste 550 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Bruce Lefavi 
801-486-9000 
#92-02-03 Tax Strategies for the 
Real Estate Owner 6 hrs 
#92-02-04 Charitable Remainder 
IltiitTmst 3 hrs 
Smith & Froerer 
298 24th St, Ste 200 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Ramona Sessions 
801-627-1870 
#92-01-20 Avoiding Real Estate 
V Licensee liability 4 hrs 
Consolidated Realty Group 
175 East 400 South, Ste. 710 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Jim Whitehead 
801-322-2000 
#92-02-01 RE Negotiating 7 hrs 
Park City Board of Realtors 
1881 Prospector Ave. 
Park City, UT 84060 
Nancy Seraphin 
801-649-7171 
^#92-03-01 Building Technology 6 hrs 
Women's Council of Realtors 
430 North Michigan Ave. 
Chicago, IL 60611 
Kim Shambrook 
312-329-8569 or 312-329-8482 
#92-03-02 Referral & Relocation 
Certification Course 101 3 hrs 
#92-03-03 Referral & Relocation 
v Certification Course 102 3 hrs 
Huntingdon, Chen-Northern, Inc. Division 
350 West 2700 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
Fred Snyder 
801-487-3661 
#92-03-07 Hazardous Waste, Environ-
Vmental Liability & RE Transactions 3 hrs J 
Utah CCIM Chapter 
5710 South Green Street 
Murray, UT 84123 
George Richards 
801-278-4416 
#92-03-30 HP-19IIB Use in RE 
V Investment Analysis 3 hrs 
U of U Correspondence Study 
2180 Annex 
Salt Lake City, UT 84112 
Sheila Steiner 
801-581-6472 
V#92-02-10 Utah RE License Law 12 hrs 
f National Business Institute, Inc. 
PO Box 3057 
Eau Claire, WI54702 
Becky Nelson 
715-835-8525 
#92-02-13 Advanced RE Law in UT 
Georgia Ball 
675 East 2100 South, #370 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
801-467-6688 
#92-03-31 Learning How to use the 
\ ^ Dispute Resolution System 2.5 \x%J 
Utah Taxpayers Association 
1578 West 1700 South, #105 
Salt Lake City UT 84104 
Howard Stephenson 
801-972-8814 
#92-04-01 
VGuard 
The Changing of the 
4hrs 
James Lemmon 
233 West 1300 South 
Hurricane, UT 84737 
801-635-4636 
V#92^ 04-02 HP-12C Intermediate 3 hrs 
Utah Valley Community College 
800 West 1200 South 
Orem, UT 84058 
AldenTueller 
801-374-9924 
#92-04-03 Tax-exempt Tru* i ales 1 hr 
Institute of Real Estate Management 
5282 South 320 West, Ste D-100 
Murray, UT 84115 
Richard Forsythe 
801-262-1706 
#92-05-01 Solving Real Estate Math 
Problems Using the HP 19BII 3 hrs 
#92-05-02 Writing a Management 
v Plan 3 hrs 
NAIOP 
The Assoc for Commercial Real Estate 
1215 Jefferson Davis Hwy, Ste 100 
Arlington, VA 22202-4302 
Bonnie Gopler 
703-979-3400 
#92-05-05 
V Deals 
Structuring Build-to-Suit 
Ibis J 
/Homeowners Marketing Services ofUtarA 
2290 East 4500 South, Ste 170 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
Curtis W. Hodgson 
801-277-3226 
#92-05-07 HMS Prove It 7 hrs 
David Johnson 
PO Box 3598 
Park City, UT 84060 
801-649-5602 
#92-01-03 RE Agency Law 3 hrs 
#92-02-02 RE Law Legal Clinic 4 hrs 
Utah Real Estate News 
KNOW 
YOUR 
LISTING 
from the 
Colorado Real Estate News 
The Commission has noted 
an increase in the number of 
complaints containing allega-
tions of misrepresentations of 
listed properties. The investi-
gations, several of which have 
resulted in disciplinary action, 
revealed a lack of thorough-
ness in researching the proper-
ties. 
Listing agents, as well as em-
ploying brokers, are reminded 
of the importance of dispensing 
accurate, confirmed informa-
tion. Every office should 
maintain a check sheet to be 
used in verifying information; 
it should identify the proper 
source of the information. 
It is important that if a prop-
erty is re-listed, updated infor-
mation be obtained. The copy-
ing of information from an old 
brochure or MLS insertion has 
proven to be the undoing of 
several agents. This is usually 
manifested in cases where 
square footages are copied as 
opposed to actual measure-
ments being taken by the list-
ing agent. Also, changes in 
zoning have often caused prob-
lems for agents. 
i i I ' I I 
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Electronic 
Testing 
Available 
The last paper-and-pencil prepen-
sing test will be administered July 
18,1992. Electronic testing will 
begin in August in Salt Lake City. 
It will be offered each Saturday 
with the exception of national 
holiday weekends. There will be 
two testing sessions per day, and a 
maximum of 33 candidates can be 
tested during each session. 
The lap-top testing device looks 
like an "Etch-a Sketch" toy. The 
questions will appear on the screen 
and the candidate can answer the 
questions by simply touching the 
screen. Absolutely no computer 
knowledge is necessary! 
Candidates will call an "800" 
number to Assessment Systems, Inc. 
(ASI) to make a reservation no less 
than three days before their desired 
Saturday test date. Cancellations of 
a reservation must be made at least 
four business days prior to the 
requested test date or the candidate 
will be charged. 
Candidates may use a calculator 
that is silent, hand-held, battery-
operated without paper tape printing 
capabilities and without an alpha-
betic keypad. 
The best news of all minutes 
after completing the examination, 
the applicant will be given the test 
results! 
AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITY 
ACT AND 
PROPERTY 
MANAGEMENT 
Much has been written about 
the Americans with Disability 
Act (ADA) since its enactment 
and since the January 26,1992 
deadline for compliance with the 
Justice Department regulations. 
Real Estate managers need to be 
concerned with who is respon-
sible for altering properties to 
conform with the Act. Is the 
owner responsible for widening 
the corridors within a commercial 
tenants space? Should the office 
tenant pay the increased common 
area charges due to the installa-
tion of lower, more accessible 
elevator panels? 
These are just some of the issues 
real estate managers should 
address about the ADA during 
new lease negotiations and lease 
renewals. 
See the accompanying article on 
the Americans with Disability 
Act on page 11. For more 
detailed information on your 
specific situation, please contact 
an attorney who is acquainted 
with the Act. 
It's hard to stand still in life. If 
you are not going forward, you 
may be going backward. Some-
times this movement is so subtle 
we're not aware of it. 
June 1992 
[Americans With Disability Act Of 1990 (" ADA") 
On January 26,1992 the Ameri-
cans with Disability Act of 1990 
became effective. For the first 
time ever, most private enter-
prises are now required to af-
I firmatively accommodate persons 
1 with disabilities, rather than 
I merely abstain from discriminat-
11 ing against them in the areas of 
J access to public places and 
1 employment rights. In other 
1 words, mere equal treatment is 
I not enough. Places of public 
1 accommodation, public services 
1 and transportation must eliminate 
barriers to access by persons with 
disabilities. 
A disability is defined as a 
physical or mental impairment 
that would substantially limit or 
impede one of life's major activities. 
A "major life activity1' would 
include: caring for oneself, perform-
ing manual tasks, walking, seeing, 
hearing, breathing, learning, or 
working. 
An impairment would include 
contagious and non-contagious 
diseases and conditions. A disability 
under this act also includes having a 
history, a record of impairment or 
being regarded as impaired. 
Employers must prohibit discrimi-
nation in employment practices (e.g., 
application, hiring, firug, advance-
ment and compensation) against 
persons with disabilities who are 
otherwise qualified to do the job. 1 
The ADA also requires employers II 
to make reasonable accommoda- II 
tions to allow otherwise qualified II 
persons with disabilities to do the 11 
job, unless such accommodation 11 
constitutes an undue hardship. 
The penalties for violation of this 
act are very severe. If you think 
you need more complete informa-
tion, please contact: 
Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission 
1801 L Street NW 
Washington, DC 20507 
800-669-EEOC (voice) 
800-800-3302 (TDD) 
fk fk fk fk fk fk fk 
AGENT LIABLE 
FOR COMPETING WITH CUSTOMER 
You have probably been 
warned about the dangers of "self-
dealing"~buying property for 
yourself without telling your 
seller. But what happens if you 
buy property for yourself without 
telling a prospective buyer? 
Tifft, an Idaho real estate broker, 
received an offer on a listing and 
passed it on to the seller. While 
the seller considered the offer, 
Tifft decided he wanted to buy the 
property for himself. He contacted 
the seller and made an offer on the 
property, with better terms than the 
original offer. 
The seller accepted Tifft's offer. 
When the prospective buyer found 
out what happened, he sued the 
broker for breach of his duty to the 
public. 
The court agreed with the buyer. 
Real estate agents have the duty to 
deal honestly and fairly with the 
general public, and cannot take 
advantage of prospective buyers. 
While many previous cases have 
held that the agent's primary duty 
is to find the best terms for the 
seller, all parties to the transaction 
must be treated fairly. The pro-
spective purchaser was allowed to 
buy the property from the agent. 
This article reprinted with permission from 
the March 1989 issue of "Real Estate 
Selling Strategies," a publication of the 
National Real Estate Institute 
12- Utah Real Estate News 
Parting Shot 
by William Coleman 
Cycles. We observe them and we 
live them. Yet another occurs in 
June as my five year term on the 
Real Estate Commission concludes. 
In June, 19871 came to the Commis-
sion as we were finishing up the new 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
form. Interestingly, I exit doing the 
same thing. We are nearing comple-
tion of the totally revised form, now 
known as the Real Estate Purchase 
Contract. Five years is a long time 
to not change our most critical form 
in an industry that is changl *z "s fast 
as ours is. I am pleased that we have 
again responded to those many 
changes. 
In the past five years the Commis-
sion has completely rewritten all the 
rules and regulations for licensees, 
and ushered in continuing education. 
This, on top of the ordinary business 
of reviewing licensing standards, 
conducting hearings, and working 
under three separate Division 
Directors. 
The most gratifying part of this 
position has been working with the 
licensees and the staff at the Divi-
sion. My respect for the work being 
done by the thousands of exceptional 
Utah real estate professionals is 
heightened by my experience with 
problems of the few. 
My respect for the incredible work 
load and the devotion of the staff at 
the Division has been most enlight-
ening. These are people working 
very hard and shorthanded for all of 
our benefits. 
As this cycle ends and another 
begins, I will look back on these past 
five years with pride and enlighten-
ment, wishing every other licensee 
could have the same experience. 
Thank you for the opportunity to 
serve you. 
Bill Coleman 
Department of Commerce 
Division of Real Estate 
P.O. Box 45806 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0806 
Distribution: Kindly Circulate and Post 
Bulk Rate 
U.S. Postage 
PAID 
S.L.C., Utah 
Permit No. 4327 
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AGENCY 
DISCLOSURE 
by Blaine Twitchell, 
Division Director 
Utah has had an 
"Agency Disclo-
sure" requirement 
for several years. 
Reports and complaints reaching the 
Division indicate there is still a lack of 
understanding on the part of the licen-
see as to what is required by this Ad-
ministrative Rule. 
Administrate Rule R174-6-14, 
Agency Disclosure, states in part "In 
every real estate transaction involving 
a licensee, as agent or principal, the 
licensee must clearly disclose in writ-
ing to the buyer and seller, lessor and 
lessee, his agency relationship(s). The 
disclosure must be made prior to the 
buyer and seller, lessor and lessee 
entering into a binding agreement with 
each other and become part of the 
permanent file. When a binding agree-
ment is signed, the prior agency dis-
closure must be confirmed in a sepa-
rate provision incorporated in or at-
tached to that agreement,..." The con-
firmation is accomplished by complet-
ing paragraph 10 of the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement. 
Frequently we find that the agent 
does not make early disclosure and 
relies on the confirmation in the Ear-
nest Money Sales Agreement to be the 
disclosure. This is too late. The damage 
has been done. By this time the buyer 
is convinced, with all of the agent's 
attention, the agent is representing the 
buyer, and the buyer has subsequently 
divulged confidential information to 
the agent In the agent's fiduciary 
ACTIVE BROKERS!! 
NO CONTINUING EDUCATION?? 
NO LICENSE!! 
Question: 1. What's an easy way for me to lose my license? 
2. What's an easy way to put my company out of business? 
3. What's an easy way to lose my sales agents? 
Answer: Do not complete Continuing Education on time. 
Active Brokers: If you do not com-
plete Continuing Education (CE) re-
quirements on time, the Division of 
Real Estate cannot renew your license 
in a timely manner and your license 
will expire. 
That means you will be unable to 
transact any real estate business until 
you have completed the CE require-
ment and a new license is issued to 
you. 
The salesagents affiliated with you 
will be placed on inactive status, and 
they will be unable to transact any real 
estate business for you until you are re-
licensed. 
In essence, you will be out of 
business! 
If your salesagents do not complete 
CE requirements, themselves, the 
Division cannot issue active licenses 
to them. That means they will be 
unable to transact any real estate busi-
ness until they have completed the CE 
requirements and are issued new li-
censes. 
You must make certain that you and 
your salesagents know the who, what, 
when, where, why, and how of Con-
tinuing Education. The answers to 
frequently asked questions are on page 
2 of this issue of the Utah Real Estate 
News. Post it in your office so every-
one can see it. If you do not understand 
something, please contact us and we 
will be happy to explain. 
Make certain you consistently read 
future issues of the Real Estate News 
for more information about Continu-
ing Education and how it affects you. 
capacity as the agent or subagent for 
the seller, he/she is obligated to pass 
on that information to the seller. The 
buyer may subsequently think his/her 
situation has been compromised and 
take legal action. 
Both the seller and the buyer should 
understand the licensee's agency posi-
tion. The agent should notify the buyer 
at the initial contact. It should be made 
official with the written disclosure 
statement signed by the buyer as soon 
as possible, especially before the agent 
begins to provide specific assistance. 
The buyer's signature on the disclo-
sure statement acknowledges that he/ 
she understands the agency role. This 
relationship is later confirmed in the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement, In 
the agency function it is advisable for 
the licensee to follow this pattern, thus 
reducing the buyer's chances of mis-
understanding, confusion and poten-
tial litigation. 
-ebruary 1992 
Disciplinary Sanctions 3 
Baldwin, Jay B„ Associate Broker, Wardley 
Better Homes and Gardens. After a formal 
hearing, Baldwin was found to have made a 
negligent misrepresentation concerning the 
condition of a roof by representing to a pur-
chaser that the roof on a home was "new", when 
in fact it was in need of repair. When Baldwin 
listed the home, which belonged to his grand-
parents and had been built in 1954, his grand-
mother stated that the home had a new roof but 
she did not indicate when the roof had been 
replaced. Baldwin maintained that his use of 
the word "new" meant "replaced" and "not 
original". Baldwin was fined $250 and his 
license was placed on probation for two years. 
#RE91-01-04. 
Hansen, Steven D., Principal Broker, Steven 
D. Hansen & Associates Real Estate. Con-
sented to revocation of his broker's license 
effective October 26, 1991 based on "being 
unworthy or incompetent to act as a principal 
broker...in such manner as to safeguard the 
interests of the public" and failing to account for 
or to remit funds or commingling or diverting 
funds. Hansen purchased a home on contract 
and agreed to assume the loan. He resold the 
home on contract and did not keep the loan 
payments current although he received pay-
ments from the contract purchasers. Hansen 
will be eligible to receive a sales agent's license 
after his broker's license has been revoked for 
one year. #RE90-09-03. 
Hutchinson, James H., Sales Agent, Kennelly 
and Associates. After a formal hearing, Hutch-
inson was found to have been convicted of a 
criminal offense involving moral turpitude, 
making a corrupt offer to abank official. Hutch-
inson was not acting as a licensee in the trans-
action. His license will be placed on probation 
for the duration of his criminal probation sub-
ject to compliance with the terms of his criminal 
probation, participation in alcohol therapy, and 
meetings every six months with the Utah Real 
Estate Commission. #RE91-03-04. 
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In Memoriam 
The Division of Real Estate would 
like to express condolences to the 
families of the following real estate 
licensees who have recently passed 
away: 
Franklin G. Adams Salt Lake 
Joann B. Dehaas Provo 
Gerald W. Obert Park City 
Karen D. Peters Layton 
Vadal W. Peterson Salt Lake 
Ray S. Tucker Provo 
Kowalsky, Greg, and L'Empire 
Suisse, Park City, Utah. Cease and Desist 
Order issued December 20, 1991 prohibiting 
offering, selling or engaging in further solicita-
tion intended to result in the sale of timeshare 
interests until such time as the timeshares are 
registered with the Division. #RE91-12-12. 
Morse, Bruce Allen, Sales Agent, Plaza Prop-
erties. License revoked by default effective 
February 10, 1992 based on conviction of a 
criminal offense involving moral turpitude and 
making a substantial misrepresentation to the 
Division. When Morse applied for a license in 
1989, he failed to disclose the conviction on his 
application. #RE91-08-01. 
Affordable Luxury Lodging and Jeff Dunn, 
Cease and Desist Order issued December 4, 
1991 prohibiting unlicensed property manage-
ment Subsequent to the issuance of the Cease 
and Desist Order, principal broker Michael 
Larsen licensed Affordable Luxury Lodging as 
a property management company under his 
supervision. #RE91-11-11. 
Fair Housing Update 
$60,000 Settlement 
in Service Dog Case 
The manager and owner of a Califor-
nia apartment complex have agreed to 
settle charges that they discriminated 
against a handicapped tenant who used 
a wheel-chair and a trained service 
dog. In the case of HUD vs. Puckett, 
No. 09-89-1495-1,7-31-90, an admin-
istrative charge of discrimination was 
filed on behalf of Delores Roberts, a 
resident, against the manager and 
owner of Quail Creek Apartments ir 
Escondido, California. Roberts ii 
unable to use her left arm and left lej 
and must rely upon a wheelchair an 
trained service dog. 
Continued on page. 
Test Date 
September 1991 
October 1991 
November 1991 
December 1991 
Prelicensing Exam Results 
Brokers 
Taken Passed 
14 4 
12 5 
26 11 
24 12 
Salesagents 
Taken Passed 
217 111 
158 90 
140 70 
129 67 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the License of : FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
Randy R. Krantz to Act as a : OF LAW AND RECOMMENDED ORDER 
Real Estate Principal Broker : Case No. RE87-11-19 
: Case No. RE89-03-12 
Appearances: 
David W. Lund for the Division of Real Estate 
Nicholas E. Hales and Brenda G. Eichers for Respondent 
By the Administrative Law Judge: 
The instant adjudicative proceeding was initiated pursuant to the issuance of an August 
21, 1989 Notice of Agency Action. The notice was sent by certified mail and received by a 
Rachael Krantz on August 22, 1989. As set forth in the notice, Respondent was required to 
file a written response with thirty (30) days from the date of the notice. 
Respondent did not timely file the written response. By motion, dated November 27, 
1989, the Division sought entry of Respondent's default. Respondent appeared for a 
December 12, 1989 hearing on the pending motion before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative 
Law Judge for the Department of Commerce. Given Respondent's appearance and his 
assurance a written response would be filed within a reasonable time, the Court took the 
motion under advisement and Respondent was ordered to file a response no later than January 
11, 1990. He was also afforded the opportunity to obtain to legal counsel for purposes of this 
proceeding. 
On January 11, 1990, Respondent filed a response in both this proceeding and another 
case which had been initiated (RE89-03-12). Pursuant to a July 31, 1990 notice, both cases 
were scheduled to be heard on August 28, 1990. However, Respondent filed a motion for 
summary judgment with respect to each case on August 23, 1990. The Division filed 
responses to those motions on September 20, 1990 and Respondent filed a final reply as to 
each motion on October 11, 1990. 
On March 6, 1991, the Court entered a recommended order as to each motion. On 
March 13, 1991, the Utah Real Estate Commission and David L. Buhler, Executive Director 
of the Department of Commerce, adopted the recommended orders which had been submitted. 
By notice, dated April 2, 1991, both cases were rescheduled to be heard on May 29-30, 1991. 
The hearing for the consolidated cases was so conducted and evidence was offered and 
received. 
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now submits the 
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order with respect to 
both cases for review by the Utah Real Estate Commission and the Director of the Division 
of Real Estate: 
Case No. RE87-11-19 (Fact Situation I) 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent is, and at all time relevant to this proceeding has been, the principal 
broker for Copper State Realty. Respondent was initially licensed as a sales agent in either 
1975 or 1976 and he received his broker's license in 1985. 
2. In March 1987, Celso Velez contacted Max Lloyd, a sales agent affiliated with 
Copper State Realty, regarding one of the brokerage's listings. Mr. Velez and Mr. Lloyd 
discussed a possible trade of the Velez home. No such trade occurred, but Respondent 
subsequently contacted Mr. Velez and indicated he had potential buyers for the Velez home. 
Mr. Velez agreed to pay a commission when Respondent inquired if he would do so. should 
Respondent sell the home to the potential buyers. Respondent informed Mr. Velez the 
potential buyers, Phil and Jan Wilson, were his in-laws. 
3. On April 5, 1987, Respondent prepared an earnest money sales agreement whereby 
the Wilsons offered to purchase the Velez home for $75,000. The offer provided for a $3,150 
cash down payment and a $71,750 FHA loan to be obtained by the Wilsons. The Velez's 
agreed to pay $1,000 toward the Wilson's total financing and loan costs. Mr. Velez and 
Respondent agreed the latter would receive a 6% commission, totalling $4,500. The Wilsons 
had provided Respondent with a $100 personal check as earnest money to be deposited on 
acceptance of the offer and the transaction was to close on or before May 15, 1987. Sparing 
detail, the Velez's accepted the offer on April 12, 1987 and Respondent deposited the earnest 
2 
money into the Copper State Realty trust account on April 13, 1987. 
4. When the Wilsons had not obtained necessary financing by May 15, 1987, the 
lender notified Respondent an addendum or another earnest money sales agreement had to be 
executed since the closing date had passed. The lender also informed Respondent the amount 
of closing costs the Velez's had agreed to pay would reduce the maximum amount the 
Wilsons could borrow. 
5. On May 20, 1987, Respondent prepared a second earnest money sales agreement, 
which also reflected a $75,000 purchase price. The Wilson's offer provided for an $800 
earnest money deposit in the form of "check and cash" (presumably $700 cash in addition to 
the previous $100 check already deposited in Respondent's trust account), a $2,450 cash 
down payment and the same amount to be financed as in the April 5, 1987 offer. Since that 
offer had been made, loan discount points had decreased. Respondent so informed the 
Velez's, who agreed to pay $400 toward the Wilson's total financing and loan costs with the 
understanding Respondent's commission would thus increase to $5,100. 
6. Based on the credible evidence presented, Respondent told Mr. Velez that he 
(Respondent) might have to lend monies to the Wilsons to help with their down payment and 
Respondent may have also told Mr. Velez those monies would come from his commission. 
However, Mr. Velez does not know whether any such payment was made and there is no 
other direct or circumstantial evidence Respondent provided any such funds to the Wilsons. 
7. On May 20, 1987, the Velez's accepted the offer and the Wilsons provided a $400 
check to Respondent, payable to Copper State Realty, as some of the additional $700 in 
earnest money to be paid. Based on the credible evidence presented, Respondent received the 
remaining earnest money in cash from Wilsons. However. Respondent did not deposit the 
additional $700 earnest money in his trust account because the transaction was scheduled to 
close on May 22, 1987, less than 72 hours later. 
8. On May 20, 1987, a Mick Quigley (who is Ms. Wilson's father) executed a gift 
letter whereby he certified he had or would provide $2,250 to Ms. Wilson prior to the closing 
to be applied toward the Wilson's purchase of the Velez home. Mr. Quigley further certified 
he expected no repayment from the Wilsons in that regard. Based on the credible evidence 
presented, Mr. Quigley provided about $1,500 of those funds (for the benefit of the Wilsons) 
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to Respondent's wife (who is also Mr. Quigley's daughter) approximately one (1) week prior 
to the closing of the transaction. Those funds were either deposited in Respondent's wife's 
personal account or their joint checking account. This record does not reflect when Mr. 
Quigley provided the remaining funds to Respondent. 
9. On May 22, 1987, Respondent issued a $2,000 check to Brighton Bank, which was 
then used to purchase a May 22, 1987 cashiers check totalling $1,450.38 payable to American 
Equity (the Wilson's lender on their purchase of the Velez home). The transaction closed on 
May 22, 1987 and the Wilsons obtained the funds necessary to close on that transaction from 
proceeds derived from the sale of their prior home and the gift monies made available by Mr. 
Quigley. On May 27, 1987, the Velez's issued a $600 check to Respondent, representing the 
additional commission they had agreed to pay him with regard to the sale of their home. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Section 61-2-11, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, provides a real estate licensee 
may be placed on probationary status, suspended or revoked if the licensee, whether acting as 
an agent or on his own account, is found guilty of: 
(1) making any substantial misrepresentation; 
(8) being unworthy or incompetent to act as a principle broker . . . as to 
safeguard the interests of the public . . .; 
(15) violating or disregarding the rules adopted by the commission and the 
division; 
(16) breaching a fiduciary duty owed by a licensee to his principle in a real 
estate transaction . . . 
The Division initially asserts Respondent violated Section 61-2-11(1) in two respects. 
Specifically, the Division contends Respondent represented to the Velez's and the lender he 
had $800 in earnest money from the Wilsons when he allegedly only had $100 on deposit in 
that regard. The Division also asserts Respondent represented to the lender the Wilsons 
would receive a portion of their down payment as a gift from Mr. Quigley when those funds 
were allegedly given to the Wilsons from Respondent. 
During the instant hearing, the Division presented testimony from Mr. Velez, the 
Wilsons and Respondent as to the Velez-Wilson transaction. The Court has considered that 
testimony with due regard for the respective ability of each witness to recall the various 
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aspects of the transaction. The Court has also duly considered the manner in which testimony 
may have been affected by the self interest of a given witness and/or the respective familial 
relationships between some of those witnesses. In many instances, the testimony offered by a 
given witness was vague. In certain respects, relatively credible testimony offered by one 
witness was either irreconcilable with the equally credible testimony of another witness or 
relevant factual issues were not adequately addressed. Given the lack of credible and 
substantial evidence presented, the Court concludes the Division's just-described assertions 
are without a sufficient factual basis. Thus, the Division has failed to satisfy its burden of 
proof regarding Count I. 
With respect to Section 61-2-11(15), the Division asserts Respondent violated R174-4-
2. That rule provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
4.2 All monies received in a real estate transaction must be 
deposited in a separate non-interest bearing "Real Estate Trust 
Account" in a Utah bank, credit union, savings and loan, or other 
approved escrow depository in this state . . . . 
4.2.1 All monies received by a licensee in a real 
estate transaction, whether it be cash or check must be 
delivered to the principal broker and deposited within three 
banking days after receipt of the funds by the licensee. 
4.2.5 All consideration represented as received 
by a licensee on an Earnest Money Sales Agreement or their 
document must have, in fact, been received by the licensee . . 
The Division alternatively asseits Respondent either did not receive $700 in additional earnest 
money from the Wilsons or he did not deposit those funds in his trust account. Given the 
credible and substantial evidence presented, the Court concludes the Division's initial 
assertion that Respondent did not receive the funds in question lacks a sufficient factual basis. 
Thus, the Division has not established that R174-4-2(4.2.5) has been violated. 
It is evident Respondent did not deposit the additional earnest money in his trust 
account. Further, none of the three exceptions to R174-4-2(4.2.1) apply in this case. The 
just-stated rule expressly requires a licensee to deposit the funds within three banking days 
after receipt of those funds. However, that rule is silent whether such a deposit is required if 
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the transaction will close and the funds will be disbursed within three banking days of their 
receipt by the licensee. 
R 174-4-2(4.2.1) should be applied with due regard for the facts and circumstances of 
this case and in recognition of the purpose for that rule, which is to ensure that funds 
received by a licensee are properly deposited in trust for the benefit of the party entitled to 
those funds. The closing statement reflects Respondent retained the $800 earnest money he 
had received and then offset the commission due to him from the Velez's by that amount. 
The earnest money was thus effectively disbursed, consistent with the terms of the May 20, 
1987 earnest money sales agreement, notwithstanding the fact that said funds were not 
previously deposited in Respondent's trust account. Since the rule would allow Respondent 
three banking days from his receipt of the funds to deposit those funds and the closing on this 
transaction occurred prior to that time, compliance with R174-4-2(4.2.1) should not be 
required under those circumstances and no basis exists to conclude Respondent violated that 
rule in this case. Thus, Count II is without merit. 
The Division contends Respondent is unworthy or incompetent to act as a principal 
broker. Specifically, the Division asserts Respondent misrepresented the nature of the 
transaction to the lender as the means to enable the Wilsons to obtain financing they would 
not have otherwise obtained. The Division also argues Respondent manipulated the 
transaction: (1) to obtain a larger commission than the Velez's had originally agreed to pay 
or (2) to secure more commission funds to be given to the Wilsons to help them purchase the 
Velez home. 
Given the lack of credible and substantial evidence presented, the Court concludes the 
Division's just-described assertions are without an adequate factual bdMS. Specifically, there 
is no sufficient evidence Respondent misrepresented the nature of this transaction with respect 
to either the amount of earnest monies paid by the Wilsons or the source of the gift monies. 
The compelling and pivotal testimony on those factual matters should have been forthcoming 
from the Wilsons. However, their testimony was either vague or evasive in numerous 
respects. The Division has thus failed to satisfy its burden of proof with respect to Count HI. 
Finally, the Division urges Respondent breached his fiduciary duty to the Velez's and 
thus failed to act in their best interest when he prepared the second earnest money sales 
6 
agreement to either obtain a larger commission or secure more commission funds to be given 
to the Wilsons to help them purchase the home. Concededly, the operative effect of that 
agreement enabled the Wilsons to borrow additional funds to purchase the Velez home. The 
second earnest money sales agreement also shifted $600, which the Wilsons would have paid 
in discount points for the benefit of the Wilsons, to Respondent in the form of an increased 
commission. 
Arguably, the Velez's could have negotiated to obtain the benefit of the decrease in 
discount points which occurred in the interim with respect to the two offers made by the 
Wilsons in this transaction. However, the Velez's understood the changes made by the 
second earnest money sales agreement (particularly that Respondent would receive a higher 
commission), they realized their net proceeds from the sale would remain the same and they 
agreed to thus accept the May 20, 1987 offer and sell their home under those circumstances. 
Based on the foregoing, no breach of fiduciary duty has been established and Count IV is 
without merit. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Counts I-IV, as set forth in Case No. RE87-11-19, 
be dismissed and no disciplinary action be entered in that regard. 
Dated this / V - ^ " day of March, 1992. 
J( Steven El/lund 
Aaministrative Law Judse 
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Case No. RE87-11-19 (Fact Situation II) 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent is, and at all time relevant to this proceeding has been, the principal 
broker for Copper State Realty. Respondent was initially licensed as a sales agent in either 
1975 or 1976. From 1979 to 1984, Respondent was the vice president of Westside 
Development, a construction company. During that time, Respondent was involved in the 
construction of approximately 70 new homes in that capacity. Respondent received his 
principal broker's license in 1985. Since late-1985, Respondent has been the president of 
Copper State Construction. During that time, Respondent was involved in the construction of 
over 100 new homes in that capacity. 
2. In late 1987, Robert and Peggy Stone owned a condominium located in 
Taylorsville, Utah. Based on a referral from a co-worker for whom Copper State 
Construction had built a home, the Stones contacted Max Lloyd, a sales agent affiliated with 
Copper State Realty. The Stones and Mr. Lloyd discussed the possible sale of the Stone's 
condominium to Copper State Construction, coupled with the Stone's purchase of a home to 
be constructed by Copper State Construction. Mr. Lloyd introduced the Stones to Respondent 
at the Copper State Realty office. 
3. Pursuant to a December 2, 1987 earnest money sales agreement, Copper State 
Construction offered to purchase the Stone's condominium for $88,000. The offer provided 
for a $100 earnest money deposit, which had been received by Mr. Lloyd, a $14,400 cash 
down payment and the possible assumption by Copper State Construction of the Stone's 
existing $73,500 mortgage. The offer was made subject to the following conditions: 
Seller to have the right to market and sell this property any time prior to 
completion of their new home located at (Murray, Utah. Lot #5 Ridge Creek. 
This offer is null and void if property is sold to a third party prior to completion 
of seller's new home 
The offer further provided that if Copper State Construction was required to assume the 
Stone's existing mortgage "and/or obtain outside financing", Copper State Construction agreed 
to use best efforts to do so and the offer was made subject to Copper State Construction's 
"qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing". The offer 
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further recited that Copper State Construction agreed to apply to assume the underlying 
obligation and/or obtain new financing within ten (10) days after the Stone's acceptance of 
the offer. The offer also recites the transaction would close on or before May 15, 1987. 
Given the date of the earnest money sales agreement, the just-stated date is obviously in error, 
the parties intending the closing to occur on or before May 15, 1988. 
4. On December 28, 1987, the Stones made a counter offer, which provided they 
would not be liable for any real estate commissions. On the just-stated date, the Stones and 
Respondent—as president of Copper State Construction-executed a December 10, 1987 
contract, whereby the Stones agreed to purchase property located on Lot #5, Ridge Creek 
Subdivision in Murray, Utah and further agreed to purchase a home to be constructed on that 
property by Copper State Construction. The contract price was $170,000 and the Stones 
made a $1,500 deposit toward payment on the contract. The just-stated contract was also 
subject to the Stones qualifying for financing on the new home. Copper State Construction 
agreed to start construction on or before December 30, 1987 and complete construction within 
145 days from that date. 
5. The document used by the Stones and Copper State Construction with regard to the 
Stone's purchase of the new home was not the standard earnest money sales agreement form 
for residential construction. Rather, Respondent had obtained the form contract which he 
used from a friend who had-in turn—obtained it from an attorney. 
6. On December 29, 1987, Respondent-on behalf of Copper State Construction-
accepted the Stone's counter offer. The $100 earnest money had been deposited to the 
Copper State Realty trust account on December 21, 1987. The Stones relied on Copper State 
Construction's agreement to purchase their condominium and assume the existing mortgage 
when they agreed to purchase the new home. Based on the credible evidence presented, the 
Stones believed if their condominium was not sold prior to completion of the construction on 
the new home, Copper State Construction would either assume the existing mortgage on the 
condominium or obtain other financing and-in either case-the Stones would no longer be 
obligated on the existing mortgage. Based on the substantial and credible evidence presented, 
Respondent only intended to purchase the home on a simple assumption of the existing loan, 
which would have been consistent with Copper State Construction's common and preferred 
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practice when it agreed to build a new home in trade for an existing residence. 
7. As of December 29, 1987, the Stones did not know under what circumstances the 
existing mortgage on the condominium could be assumed. There is no substantial evidence 
either Mr. Lloyd or Respondent discussed that matter with the Stones at that time. There is 
also no substantial evidence Mr. Lloyd or Respondent ever made any inquiry of the lender at 
that time whether the loan could be assumed or that Mr. Lloyd and Respondent discussed any 
possible assumption of the loan by Copper State Construction. 
8. In mid-May 1988, the Stones contacted Respondent as their new home was nearing 
completion. The Stone's condominium had not been sold by that time. The Stones thus 
requested Respondent to undertake efforts to assume the existing loan on their condominium. 
Based on the credible evidence presented, Respondent informed the Stones he had only 
intended to market their condominium for resale, he had only promised to make payments on 
the existing mortgage until the condominium was sold and he never intended to formally 
assume the existing loan to thus relieve the Stones from future liability for any payments on 
that loan. Based on the more credible and substantial evidence presented, Respondent-on 
behalf of Copper State Construction-contacted the lender on the mortgage for the Stone's 
condominium and was informed Copper State Construction could not purchase the 
condominium on a simple assumption, due to an owner occupancy requirement. When 
Respondent subsequently offered to purchase the Stone's condominium on contract, the 
Stones declined that offer. 
9. The Stones had sought financing from Crossland Mortgage Company to purchase 
the new home. Approval of any such financing was contingent on the sale of the Stone's 
condominium. On July 26. 1988, the Stones notified Copper State Construction they were 
terminating the contract to purchase the new home due to their inability to obtain financing. 
Copper State Construction could not formally assume the loan on the Stone's existing 
condominium nor was it ever Respondent's intent that Copper Sate Construction would do so. 
The Stones refused to sell their condominium to Copper State Construction on a simple 
assumption because it was never their intent to do so and they had initially agreed to sell the 
condominium with the understanding that only Copper State Construction would be thereafter 
obligated to make payment in satisfaction of the outstanding indebtedness on the 
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condominium. 
10. On July 26, 1988, the Stones thus demanded return of both the $1,500 deposit 
regarding the new home and the $100 earnest money deposit Copper State Construction had 
made respecting its' offer to purchase their condominium. The Stones also filed a complaint 
with the Salt Lake Board of Realtors. On August 1, 1988, Respondent received a notice from 
the Salt Lake Board of Realtors concerning that complaint. In late August or early September 
1988, proceedings were conducted before a Board arbitration committee. On October 10, 
1988, the Stones and Copper State Construction reached an agreement, whereby the latter 
would return the $1,500 deposit paid by the Stones and the Stones executed a release of the 
$100 earnest money. On October 10, 1988, the Stones received a $1,500 check, signed by 
Respondent on behalf of Copper State Construction. When that check did not clear the bank, 
Respondent subsequently replaced it with a cashier's check. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Section 61-2-11 provides a real licensee may be placed on probationary status, 
suspended or revoked if the licensee, whether acting as an agent or on his own account, is 
found guilty of: 
(1) making any substantial misrepresentation; 
(2) making any false promises of a character likely to influence, 
persuade, or induce; 
(15) violating or disregarding . . . the rules adopted by the 
commission and the division . . . . 
The Division initially asserts Respondent violated Section 61-2-11(1) when he represented to 
the Stones that Copper State Construction would assume the mortgage on their condominium. 
the Stones relied on that representation in agreeing to purchase the new home from Copper 
State Construction and the latter did not assume—or apply to assume—the existing mortgage 
on the condominium. The Division further urges Respondent violated Section 61-2-11(2) 
when he made a false promise to the Stones that Copper State Construction would assume 
their mortgage and he did not intend to assume that mortgage, as allegedly evidenced by the 
provision in the earnest money sales agreement allowing for sale of the condominium to a 
third party before closing and Copper State Construction's alleged failure to ever apply to 
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assume the mortgage or obtain other financing to do so. 
Sections 61-2-11(1) and (2) provide that a substantial misrepresentation or false 
promise by a licensee may prompt entry of a disciplinary sanction. Utah courts have 
frequently set forth the elements of an intentional, or fraudulent, misrepresentation as follows: 
(1) a misrepresentation; (2) concerning a presently existing material fact; (3) 
which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) 
made recklessly knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base 
such representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; 
(6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did 
in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and 
damage. 
Dugan vs. Jones, Utah, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (1980); Nikkelson vs. Quail Valley Realty, Utah, 
641 P.2d 124, 126 (1982); Secor vs. Knight, Utah, 716 P.2d 790, 794 (1986); Conder vs. A. 
L. Williams & Associates, Inc., Utah App., 739 P.2d 634, 637 (1987). Generally, intentional 
fraud requires proof of an intent to deceive. Significantly, it has been recognized such intent 
may be inferred if a misrepresentation is "voluntarily communicated to the victim with 
knowledge that it is false, or without knowing whether it is true or false, but knowing that the 
victim is likely to rely on it". Galloway vs. AFCO Development Corp., Utah App., 777 P.2d 
506, 509 (1989). 
It is well settled that a "promise of future performance, when made with a present 
intent not to perform and made to induce a party to act in reliance on that promise, 
constitutes actionable deceit and fraud." Von Hake vs. Thomas, Utah, 705 P.2d 766, 770 
(1985). In essence, a fraudulent misrepresentation or a "false promise", as that language is 
used in Section 61-2-11(2), exists if a promise is made without a present intent to perform as 
promised. Galloway vs. AFCO Development Corp.. supra; Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives 
vs. Meibos, Utah, 607 P.2d 798, 805 (1980). In other words, the promisor must have had a 
"preconceived intention not to perform the promises made." Schow vs. Guardtone, Inc., 18 
Utah2d 135, 138, 417 P.2d 643 (1966). The mere fact a "promisor failed to perform his 
promise" is not sufficient to establish a fraudulent misrepresentation. Schow vs. Guardtone, 
Inc., supra. 
Since the falsity of a promise is reflected by the present intent of the promisor not to 
perform as promised, such alleged conduct necessarily involves proof of such an intent to 
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deceive. Given the foregoing, and with particular regard to the facts of this case, the initial 
inquiry is whether Respondent-acting as either an agent or on his own account-made a false 
promise to the Stones with regard to whether Copper State Construction would assume the 
existing mortgage on their condominium. It is evident the Stones and Respondent shared no 
common intent and had no joint understanding that Copper State Construction would formally 
assume the existing mortgage in question. There is no substantial evidence Respondent-
either directly or through Mr. Lloyd-made any representation or promise to the Stones 
regarding the manner by which Copper State Construction could or would assume that loan. 
Further, the earnest money sales agreement does not clearly reflect whether Copper State 
Construction's possible assumption of the loan would occur through either a formal or simple 
assumption. 
Significantly, the earnest money sales agreement expressly allowed the Stones to 
market and sell their condominium to a third party prior to the completion of a new home. It 
is obvious both the Stones and Respondent anticipated that possibility for approximately five 
months and Respondent likely hoped the condominium would be sold to a third party before 
it became necessary for Copper State Construction to assume the lean. When it became clear 
no sale to a third party would be realized, the Stones contacted Respondent and the latter then 
inquired of the lender as to whether the loan was assumable. 
Nevertheless, Respondent-on behalf of Copper State Construction-had promised to 
assume the loan without knowledge at that time whether Copper State Construction could do 
so on a simple assumption. When Copper State Construction offered to purchase the 
condominium, Respondent did not know under what-if any—circumstances the loan could be 
a>sumed. Since Respondent intended Copper State Construction would only assume the loan 
by a simple assumption, it was incumbent on Respondent to only make such a promise if he 
knew Copper State Construction could do so. 
Under those circumstances, Respondent recklessly represented to the Stones that 
Copper State Construction would purchase the condominium and possibly assume their loan 
on a simple assumption without sufficient knowledge on which to base that representation. 
Thus, Respondent made a false promise that Copper State Construction would assume the 
loan on the condominium by a simple assumption, he had insufficient knowledge upon which 
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to promise such action since he did not know whether Copper State Construction could so 
assume that loan and the promise was made for the purpose of inducing the Stones to 
purchase a new home to be built by Copper State Construction. Further, the Stones acted 
reasonably and in ignorance of whether their loan on the condominium could be assumed by 
Copper State Construction, the Stones relied on the false promise made by Respondent and 
they were thereby induced to act to their injury and damage. Respondent thus violated 
Section 61-2-11(2). 
The Division next asserts Respondent violated or disregarded R174-4.2.7.4, which 
provides: 
In the event a dispute arises over the return or forfeiture of the earnest 
money and/or other trust funds, and no party has filed a civil suit arising 
out of the transaction, the principal broker must, within fifteen (15) days 
of notice of the dispute, provide the parties written notice of the dispute 
and request them to meet to arbitrate the matter. The principal broker 
holding the earnest money and/or trust funds must act as arbitrator. In the 
event the dispute is not resolved in the arbitration attempt, the principal 
broker must, within forty-five (45) days of the date on which the principal 
broker mailed or delivered to both parties notice of the dispute, interplead 
the disputed funds into the court of appropriate jurisdiction. A copy of the 
interpleader action must be retained in the principal broker's files until 
final disbursement of funds. 
The Stones notified Respondent on July 26, 1988 of the dispute regarding both the $1,500 
deposit concerning the new home and the $100 earnest money deposit Copper State 
Construction had made respecting its offer to purchase their condominium. Pursuant to the 
just-quoted rule, Respondent would have had fifteen (15) days from that date to provide the 
Stones and Copper State Construction with written notice of the dispute and request them to 
meet to arbitrate the matter. The rule, if strictly applied according to its terms, would have 
also required Respondent to arbitrate the dispute. 
Concededly, Respondent provided no written notice to the Stones and Copper State 
Construction of the dispute and he did not request them to meet to arbitrate that matter. 
Nevertheless, the Court duly notes Respondent's status as the president of Copper State 
Construction. Under those circumstances, it would have been a clear conflict of interest for 
Respondent to have arbitrated any dispute between the Stones and Copper State Construction. 
Significantly, an arbitration proceeding was conducted before the Salt Lake Board of Realtors 
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within approximately five (5) weeks after the Stones notified Respondent of the dispute. 
Although there is no evidence Respondent took any action to initiate that proceeding and he 
did not arbitrate the dispute, he should be excused from strict compliance with that 
requirement of the rule. 
R174-4.2.7.4 also requires that if the dispute is not resolved in an arbitration attempt 
conducted within forty-five (45) days from the date the principal broker mailed or delivered 
to both parties notice of the dispute, the principal broker shall interplead the disputed funds 
into a court of appropriate jurisdiction. Over forty-five (45) days lapsed from the time the 
Stones notified Respondent of the dispute until the Stones and Copper State Construction had 
resolved the matter by agreement. While it is not clear from this record whether the 
resolution of their dispute was a product of that arbitration proceeding or a separate 
agreement between the Stones and Copper State Construction, the Court duly notes the unique 
circumstances of this case. Based thereon, the Court is not persuaded R 174-4.2.7.4 should be 
rigidly applied as to conclude Respondent has violated that rule. Thus, the Division's 
assertion in that regard is without merit. 
Finally, the Division asserts the contract which Respondent used to effect both the sale 
of real property to the Stones and their purchase of a new residence was not the standard 
earnest money sales agreement for residential construction approved for use by licensees. 
The Division thus urges Respondent violated Section 61-2-20 and, as a consequence thereof, 
Section 61-2-12(15). 
Section 61-2-20 provides: 
Real estate licensees may fill out those forms approved by the Utah 
Real Estate Commission and the attorney general and those forms provided 
by statute, with the following exceptions: 
(1) Principal brokers and associate brokers may fill out any 
documents associated with the closing of a 
real estate transaction; 
(2) Real estate licensees may fill out real estate forms prepared 
by legal counsel of the buyer, seller, lessor, or lessee, or any 
legal counsel, provided that the Real Estate Commission and 
attorney general have not approved a specific form necessary 
to that transaction. 
Respondent admits he did not use the specific real estate form, approved by the Commission 
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and attorney general, to effect the Stone's purchase of the new home. However, Respondent 
urges Section 61-2-10 does not apply because he did not prepare the contract as a licensee or 
on behalf of Copper State Realty, but solely on behalf of Copper State Construction and that 
Copper State Realty was not involved in that transaction. 
No proper basis exists to view the two transactions between the Stones and Copper 
State Construction as distinct and unrelated. Moreover, Section 61-2-11 can apply whether 
Respondent acted in either his capacity as a licensee or on his own account. By analogy, 
Section 61-2-20 should also apply under either circumstance in this case, even though 
Respondent was acting as the president of Copper State Construction when he prepared and 
used the contract in question. Consequently, Respondent violated Section 61-2-2(20) and a 
further basis exists to enter a disciplinary sanction with respect to Respondent's license to 
practice as a real estate principal broker. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
The recommended disciplinary action with respect to Counts VI-VIE in this case is 
addressed below, in conjunction with the findings of fact and conclusions of law pertinent to 
Case No. RE89-03-12, which was heard on a consolidated be ^ in this proceeding. 
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Case No. RE89-03-12 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The findings of fact previously set forth in Paragraph 1 of Case No. RE87-11-19 
(Factual Statement II) are incorporated herein by reference. 
2. As of January 1988, James and Valerie Gaster owned a house located at 7588 
Dover Hill Drive in Salt Lake City, Utah. Approximately two (2) years earlier, the Gasters 
had listed that property for sale through Terry Hill-Black, a real estate sales agent. Based on 
the credible evidence presented, Mrs. Gaster initially contacted Respondent in late 1987 and 
she generally inquired about a possible trade of the Gaster home for another residence. Mrs. 
Gaster also contacted Ms. Hill-Black about a possible trade of properties in that regard. 
3. Based on the more credible evidence presented, Mr. Gaster saw an advertisement by 
Copper State Realty and he specifically contacted Respondent to inquire about a trade of the 
Gaster residence for a new home. Mr. Gaster met with Respondent in late January or early 
February 1988 and Respondent saw the Gaster home, which was available for sale by owner 
at that time. Ms. Hill-Black accompanied the Gasters when they saw a new home, located at 
358 E. Bridlewalk Lane in Murray, Utah, built by Copper State Construction. 
4. On February 9, 1988, the Gasters offered to purchase the Bridlewalk Lane property 
from Copper State Construction for $189,000. Ms. Hill-Black, who was affiliated with Gump 
& Ayers Real Estate Inc., represented the Gasters and she prepared that earnest money sales 
agreement which provided the Gasters would apply for financing through Crossland 
Mortgage Corporation. 
5. On February 9, 1988, Copper State Construction offered to purchase the Gaster's 
home for $102,000. Based on the credible and substantial evidence presented. Ms. Hill-Black 
prepared that earnest money sales agreement at Respondent's direction, but it was Respondent 
who represented the Gasters as their agent in that transaction. Respondent, acting as principal 
broker for Copper State Realty, receipted the earnest money deposit on that offer and he 
signed the offer in his capacity as president of Copper State Construction. 
6. The just-described offer, which provided Copper State Construction would assume 
the $83,000 existing mortgage on the Gaster's home, was also made subject to the following 
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conditions: 
Seller to have the right to market or sell property any time prior to 
completion of home located at 358 E. Bridlewalk Lane, if home is sold 
prior to completion of buyer's new home, this offer is null & void. 
On February 10, 1988, the Gasters accepted the offer. Five days later, the Gasters entered 
into a listing agreement with Copper State Realty, whereby the Dover Hill Drive property was 
listed for sale at $94,000. 
7. Sparing detail, addendums to both offers were executed on March 15, 1988, 
whereby the sale price on the Dover Hill Drive and Bridlewalk Lane properties were reduced 
to $94,000 and $181,000, respectively. The sale of each property was scheduled to close on 
April 1, 1988. The Gasters applied for a conventional mortgage through Crossland Mortgage 
Corporation to purchase the Bridlewalk Lane property. Proof of the Gaster's sale of their 
home was a necessary condition to the financing on their purchase of the Bridlewalk Lane 
property. 
8. The closing on each transaction was conducted on April 21, 1988. Respondent, Ms. 
Hill-Black and the Gasters were among those present at that time. Respondent signed the 
closing statements as president of Copper State Construction. Both Gump & Ayers Real 
Estate Inc. and Copper State Realty shared the commission on the sale of the Bridlewalk Lane 
property. Mr. Gaster executed a warranty deed to Copper State Construction, whereby the 
latter assumed and agreed to pay an all-inclusive trust deed with a current principle balance of 
$82,988.24 in favor of a Dean C Burnham and Charlotte L. Beeson. Copies of the settlement 
statement and the warranty deed on the sale of the Dover Hill Drive property were submitted 
to Ciossland Moitgage Coipoiation as pi oof of the sale of that property Ciossland Mortgage 
Corporation closed the loan on the Gaster's purchase of the Bridlewalk Lane propeity in 
reliance on those documents 
9. Based on the credible and substantial evidence presented, Respondent reasonably 
believed Copper State Construction would be able to make the necessary payments when 
Copper State Construction purchased the Dover Hill Drive property. However, several homes 
which Copper State Construction had contracted to build were not timely completed between 
sometime in April 1988 through June 1988 and various closings on newly constructed homes 
were delayed or did not occur during that time. Consequently, Copper State Construction 
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lacked the funds necessary to satisfy payments due on the Dover Hill Drive property. 
10. Sometime between April 1988 and June 14, 1988, three liens were filed on the 
Bridlewalk Lane property by subcontractors and suppliers for non-payment of services and 
materials provided during the construction of that house. Specifically, a $244 lien was filed 
sometime in April 1988 for garage doors which had been installed. This record does not 
reflect exactly when that lien was filed. A $4,133 lien was filed on April 22, 1988 for 
materials provided by Jordan Home Builders and a $2,980 lien was filed on June 14, 1988 for 
labor and materials provided by Prows Plastering. Respondent did not inform the Gasters at 
closing that any subcontractors or materialmen had not been paid. Copper State Construction 
subsequently made payments to satisfy the just-described liens, although this record does not 
reflect when those payments were made. 
11. Copper State Construction's first payment on the trust deed note was due June 1, 
1988. Ms. Beeson contacted Mr. Gaster and informed him no payment had been made. The 
latter then inquired of Respondent, who indicated the payment had been made, but not 
properly credited. Beyond Respondent's self-serving testimony, there is no substantial 
evidence any such payment was made. Approximately one month later, Mr. Gaster became 
aware still no payments had been made. Mr. Gaster then contacted Respondent, who 
indicated he would attempt to make the necessary payments. 
12. On September 4, 1988, a notice of default was recorded which reflected a $4,705 
delinquency for non-payment from June through September 1988. On February 7, 1989, 
notice was issued of a trustee sale to be conducted with respect to the Dover Hill Drive 
property. The Gasters subsequently paid $8,750 to relinquish all claims and avoid foreclosure 
on that property. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Section 61-2-11 provides a real estate licensee may be placed on probationary status, 
suspended or revoked if the licensee, whether acting as an agent or on his own account, is 
found guilty of: 
(1) making any substantial misrepresentation; 
(2) making any false promises of a character likely to influence, 
persuade, or induce; 
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(8) being unworthy or incompetent to act as a principal broker . . . 
in such manner as to safeguard the interests of the public; 
(16) breaching a fiduciary duty owed by a licensee to his principal 
in a real estate transaction. 
The Division initially asserts Respondent violated Section 61-2-11(1) when: (1) he 
represented to the Gasters that Copper State Construction would purchase the Dover Hill 
Drive property and assume the obligation on that property; (2) the Gasters relied on those 
representations when they agreed to purchase the Bridlewalk property from Copper State 
Construction; (3) Crossland Mortgage Corporation also relied on those representations when it 
granted a loan to the Gasters for the just-referenced purchase; (4) Respondent knew or should 
have known Copper State Construction would not be able to make the necessary payments on 
the Dover Hill Drive property; and (5) Copper State Construction failed to make any 
payments on the trust deed with respect to that property. 
Concededly, Respondent became aware of Copper State Construction's perilous 
financial condition shortly after the April 21, 1988 closing on its purchase of the Gaster's 
home. Further, Copper State Construction made no payments with respect to the existing 
trust deed on that property. However, there is a lack of sufficient evidence to conclude 
Respondent—acting on behalf of Copper State Construction-promised to make the necessary 
payments on the Gater's home with an existing intent not to so perform. As previously 
noted, the mere fact that "a promisor failed to perform his promise" is not sufficient to 
establish a fraudulent misrepresentation. Schow v. Guardtone, Inc., supra. Importantly, there 
is a lack of sufficient evidence Respondent knew or should have known Copper State 
Construction would be unable to make those payments when Copper State Construction 
agreed to do so. Given the foregoing, the Division's assertions that Respondent violated 
Sections 61-2-11(1) or (2) in those respects is without merit. 
However, Respondent's failure to disclose to the Gasters that subcontractors and 
materialmen had not been paid constitutes a misrepresentation by omission. Based on the 
evidence presented, that misrepresentation was intentionally made and was also substantial, 
within the meaning of Section 61-2-11(1). Whether it is a common occurrence for 
outstanding amounts to be owed for materials and labor provided as to the construction of a 
new home at the time the sale of that home is closed, Respondent should have advised the 
20 
Gasters if any such indebtedness existed at the time of closing. His failure to do so 
constitutes a violation of Section 61-2-11(1). Fortunately, Copper State Construction 
subsequently made payment to satisfy the liens which had been filed on the Gaster's home. 
The Division next asserts Respondent is either unworthy or incompetent to act as a 
principal broker in such manner as to safeguard the interests of the public. The Court 
initially notes Mr. Gaster contacted Respondent sometime in June 1988 and inquired why 
Copper State Construction had made no payment with respect to the trust deed. Respondent's 
subsequent conduct is seriously disturbing in certain respects. Other than his mere assurance 
to Mr. Gaster that the June 1988 payment had been made, there is no evidence Respondent 
then exercised any reasonable diligence to insure the payment was made and properly credited 
as to protect the Gasters' interests. Respondent was also aware of Copper State 
Construction's mounting cash flow problems at that time, yet he neglected to disclose that 
fact to Mr. Gaster. 
Although Respondent later told Mr. Gaster he would try to make the necessary 
payments as to the trust deed, Respondent had no reasonable basis to believe he could do so. 
Further, Respondent still failed to inform the Gasters of Copper State Construction's 
deteriorating financial condition. Since Copper State Construction did not formally assume 
the existing indebtedness on the Dover Hill Drive property and the Gasters would thus be 
obligated to make timely payment in satisfaction of the trust deed if Copper State 
Construction failed to do so, Respondent should have kept the Gasters fully informed as to 
any difficulties which Copper State Construction encountered in making timely payment of 
that monthly obligation. Respondent's failure to do so required the Gasters to subsequently 
expend a significant lump sum amount to avoid foreclosure on the Dover Hill Drive property. 
Respondent's misconduct reflects an inexcusable failure to protect the Gasters' interests. He 
has thus violated Section 61-2-11(8) and a proper basis exists to enter a disciplinary sanction 
in that regard. 
Finally, the Division asserts Respondent violated Section 61-2-12(16) when he 
allegedly breached a fiduciary duty owed to the Gasters in the transaction under review. 
Based on the more credible and substantial evidence presented, Respondent was the agent for 
the Gasters with regard to Copper State Construction's purchase of the Gaster's home. 
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Respondent thus owed the Gasters a fiduciary duty to act in their best interest. Respondent 
breached that duty when he represented to the Gasters that Copper State Construction would 
make the necessary payments on the trust deed, but no such payments were subsequently 
made. 
A considered review of Respondent's conduct with regard to the transactions involving 
the Stones and the Gasters reveals numerous instances when he violated those statutes and/or 
rules which govern the conduct of principal brokers and sales agents in this state. 
Respondent's repeated failure to adequately protect the interests of the Stones and the Gasters 
was often coupled with his consistent efforts to further either his own interests or those of 
Copper State Construction. Simply put, Respondent did not act in an honest and ethical 
manner and he failed to properly discharge his duties as a licensee. Respondent's multiple 
instances of unprofessional conduct warrant entry of an appropriate disciplinary sanction to 
thus adequately protect the public health, safety and welfare. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's license to practice as a real estate 
principal broker be revoked, said revocation to become effective as provided by Section 61-2-
12(2)(c)(i). . ^ 
Dated this /6**dav of March, 1992. 
Administrative Law Judge 
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BEFORE THE REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
OF THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
In the Matter of the License ORDER 
of RANDY R. KRANTZ to Act CASE NO. RE87-11-19 
as a Real Estate Broker CASE NO. RE89-03-12 
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommended Orders on the above-referenced cases are hereby 
confirmed and adopted. The license of Randy R. Krantz to act as a 
real estate licensee is hereby revoked, effective O \J\A& o , 
1992. It is further ordered that he may not apply for a new 
license for at least three years; however, no promise is made that 
a new license will be granted upon a future application. 
DATED this St^u day of April , 1992. 
UTAH REAL ESTATE^COMMISSION 
fj , sfls/ f 
WILLIAM H. COLEMAN 
J } 
PAUL NEUENSCHWANDER 
Rb^w> 
BETH TOLBERT 
CLAUDIA E. ASHBY 
confirmed and approved by the undersigned 
of f/fACf , 1992. 
BLAINE ETTTWITCHELL, DIRECTOR 
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
ORDER ON REVIEW 
BEFORE THE 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE 
OF RANDY KRANTZ TO ACT AS A 
REAL ESTATE PRINCIPAL BROKER 
ORDER ON REVIEW 
CASE NO. RE87-11-19 
CASE NO. RE89-03-12 
INTRODUCTION 
This is a review, upon the request of Randy Krantz 
("Respondent") of a decision of the Real Estate Commission (the 
"Commission") and the Division of Real Estate of the Department of 
Coiomerce (the ^Division"), dated April 8, 1992, which revoked 
Respondent's license to act as a Real Estate Broker. The Order was 
the result of consolidation of the two above-referenced cases. 
Therev was no oral argument in connection with this review, and 
Respondent represented himself during the review process. 
STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW 
Review is conducted pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 
63-46b-12, and Rule 151-46b-12 of the Rules of Procedure for 
Adjudicative Proceedings before the Department of Commerce. 
THE ISSUES REVIEWED 
Respondent did not clearly identify those facts from the 
Order's Findings of Facts which he disputes on appeal. From 
Respondent's lengthy narrative supporting his request for review, 
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the issues can be summarized as follows: 
1. Whether the Board's and Division's Orders are supported 
by the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; and 
2. Whether the length of time which passed between filing 
the petitions, and issuing the Order, prejudices Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Findings of Fact adopted by the Commission and the 
Division are adopted for purposes of this Review. They are 
lengthy, and will not be repeated herein. With respect to Case No. 
RE 87-11-19, a portion of the Complaint was dismissed, as the Order 
concluded that the Division had not met its burden of proof with 
respect to the complaint involving the Velez's. Respondent does 
not appeal that portion of the Order, and, consequently, it is not 
reviewed herein. 
2. Respondent offered his version of events in his request 
for review. However, he did not clearly indicate which Findings of 
Fact he believed to be incorrect or unsupported by the evidence. 
It appears that Respondent was, in the request for review, 
repeating the evidence he presented at the hearing. The Board and 
the Administrative Law Judge were present, heard the testimony of 
both sides, and weighed the evidence. Respondents' repeating his 
evidence in the request for review does not constitute sufficient 
grounds to overturn the Findings of Fact. For any findings to be 
overturned on review, Respondent would need to show how a finding 
of fact was made erroneously, or was not based on the evidence 
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presented, and show how his version of the facts was supported by 
the evidence, 
3. Finally, much of Respondent's assertions in the request 
for review, even if true, would not materially change the outcome. 
In Case No. RE87-11-19, the Order was based on a finding that 
Respondent made a substantial misrepresentation. The fact 
supporting this finding was primarily that Respondent had offered 
to assume the Stones' loan, and that such promise was made 
recklessly because Respondent did not know whether or not he would 
be able to assume the loan, or disregarded evidence that he would 
not be able to do so. Respondent, in his request for review, does 
not dispute that he offered to assume the loan. Nor does he 
dispute that his company was in serious financia] difficulty at the 
time. 
4. The Order also was based on the fact that Respondent used 
a form not approved by the Division, in connection with the 
contract which Respondent used to effect the sale of property to 
the Stones and the Stones' purchase of a new home. Respondent does 
not dispute that the form was unauthorized, but asserts that 
authorization was not required because the transaction was on 
behalf of Copper State Construction, rather than Copper State 
Realty, and the two entities were not related. Thus, the Finding 
of Facts on this point — that Copper State Construction entered 
into an agreement to purchase the Stone's existing home, as well as 
a second agreement to sell another home to the Stones, and neither 
form was approved by the Division — is upheld; the legal 
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consequence of this Finding (whether Copper State Construction is 
"related" to Copper State Realty and, thus, approval was required 
— is discussed below, in the Conclusions of Law. 
5. In Case No. RE 89-03-12, the Order was based on a finding 
that Respondent had failed to disclose existing liens and potential 
liens against the home sold to the Gasters, and had failed to 
disclose Copper State Construction's financial problems to the 
Gasters, at a time when it had undertaken certain financial 
obligations and was unlikely to be able to meet them. Again, as 
before, Respondent reasserts his version of events without 
specifically showing how the Findings of Fact were incorrect. 
Indeed, Respondent acknowledges the existing liens on the Gaster's 
home, and that suppliers had not been paid at the time of closing. 
6. The other key finding of fact in that Order was that 
Respondent had been acting in the capacity of an "agent" for the 
Gasters, thereby owing them a fiduciary duty. Respondent appears 
to assert that he was not in fact the Gasters' agent, because 
Copper State Realty had no listing agreement with the Gasters to 
sell their old home, and a commission was not charged. The request 
for review acknowledges that Respondent inspected the Gaster's old 
home; discussed with the Gasters the possible purchase of the home 
by Copper State Construction; allowed an earnest money agreement to 
be prepared which showed that Copper State Realty would deposit 
money into its trust account; that Copper State Construction was to 
make payments on its purchase of the Gaster's old home; that 
Respondent was making decisions as to whether or not to rent the 
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old home (Mwe believed the home to be more marketable if it was 
vacantM) ; and that Copper State Construction "intended to sell this 
home". It is impossible to find, given these facts and 
circumstances, that Respondent did not act as an agent for the 
Gasters. Whether or not he believed he was an agent, certainly the 
Gasters were entitled to believe that he was their agent, acting on 
their behalf. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In Case No. 87-11-19, the finding that Respondent made a 
substantial misrepresentation in his promise to assume the Stones' 
loan constitute sufficient evidence to find that Respondent 
violated §61-2-11(1). 
2. In Case No. 87-11-19, the Conclusions of Law also found 
that Respondent used a form not approved by the Division, in 
violation of 61-2-20, and that this constituted grounds for action 
against Respondent's license under §61-2-12(15) (which is 
apparently a misprint, and should be §61-2-11(15)). That portion 
of the Order also references §61-2-10, making it unlawful for an 
agent to accept consideration from anyone other than his principal 
broker. Respondent asserts that Copper State Realty and Copper 
State Construction were not related, and that one could not 
possibly know about the financial condition of the other. 
Respondent was President and director of Copper State Construction. 
His wife was owner of 50% of the shares. In light of this, his 
statement that, since he was not an owner of Copper State 
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Construction he did not know of its financial problems is plainly 
without merit. And, in light of the fact that Respondent was 
principal broker for Copper State Realty, the conclusions that the 
transactions were related and should have been evidenced by use of 
a form approved by the division are upheld. 
3. In Case No. RE 89-03-12, the failure to disclose existing 
liens and unpaid debts constituted substantial misrepresentations 
under the circumstances, and the Conclusions of Law that Respondent 
violated. §61-2-11(1) are upheld. Similarly, Respondent violated 
the fiduciary duty he had to the Gasters to disclose the financial 
problems of Copper State Construction. The original conclusion 
that his failure to do so constitutes a violation of §61-2-11(8) 
and §61-2-11(16) is upheld. 
4. With respect to whether delay between filing the 
Petitions and issuing the Order should constitute grounds for 
overturning the Order, the key length of time is the approximately 
nine months which elapsed between the date of the hearing (May 29 
and 30, 1991) and the date of the order (April 8, 1992). The 
original petitions were filed during August of 1989 and 
consolidated shortly thereafter so as to be heard in one hearing. 
Respondent originally defaulted, having failed to answer, and was 
granted an extension of time by the Administrative Law Judge to 
answer the Petition. Respondent also moved for summary judgement 
during the interim before the hearing, and certain settlement 
negotiations occurred, which also cause delay in the petitions' 
being heard. The Recommended Order was prepared on March 18, 1992, 
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and adopted by the Commission — which typically meets only once a 
month — on April 8. Respondent is understandably unsatisfied with 
the delays in this case. Some of them were at his behest. There 
cannot be an absolute time of delay between a hearing and issuance 
of an order which can be held to be both unreasonable and injurious 
to Respondent. Although it is unfortunate, it is not clearly 
unreasonable, given that the case involved two separate petitions, 
which between them set out three different factual situations. The 
hearing consumed two days and there evidently were a large number 
of witnesses and abundant documentary evidence to consider. There 
was no formal restriction on Respondent's practice during the 
pendency of these matters. Therefore, the delay was not so 
unreasonable or so injurious to Respondent as to require 
overturning the Order. 
ORDER 
IT IS ORDERED THAT: 
The Order in this case is upheld. Pursuant to Department Rule 
151-46b-12 (B) , the effective date of that order is now ten (10) 
days after the date this Order on Review has been mailed to all 
parties, or June^2 , 1992. 
Dated this _ day of June, 1992. 
David L. Buhler, Executive Director 
Department of Commerce 
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NOTICE OF RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Judicial review of this Order may be sought by filing a 
Petition for Review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of 
this Order. Any Petition for such Review shall comply with the 
requirements set forth in Section 63-46b-14 and Section 63-46b-16. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify^that on the day of June 1992 I caused to 
be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order on Review, 
properly addressed, postage prepaid, (unless otherwise indicated) 
to; 
Respondent: 
Randy Krantz 
2216 East Lauri Kay Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
Attorney for Respondent: 
Nicholas E. Hales 
Woodbury/ Jensen, Kesler & Swinton 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 3358 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-3358 
and caused a copy to be hand-delivered to: 
^'Blaine E. Twitchell, Director 
Division of Real Estate 
P.O Box 45806 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0806 
Robert Steed, Assistant A,G. 
Beneficial Life Tower 
11th Floor 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
d^l^t 
